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ETHICS AND THE SETTLEMENTS OF MASS
TORTS: WHEN THE RULES MEET THE ROAD
CarrieMenkel-Meadowt
t Professor of Law, UCLA; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. I
come to this project as someone who would not sign on to the "Law Professors' Brief" in
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 FR.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). As a legal ethicist, however, I agreed with some of what was written in that brief, most notably that the strict
application of some of the ethics rules suggests that there may have been some violations of
those rules in that class action settlement of asbestos cases. I also think that there may have
been some "troubling" activity on the part of the participants to the case that would not
necessarily constitute formal ethical violations, but that might offend our notions ofjustice,
fairness, equity, "proper" attorney client relations, and the like.
Like others contributing to this symposium, I will situate myself in relation to this
particular case, as I make claims for what I think the larger issues are for our system to
resolve. I attended the closing arguments in Ceorgine. I have read many, though clearly
not all, of the legal documents filed, as well as many of the transcripts of the fairness
hearing in Georgineand several other of the recent "mass torts class action settlements" that
have provoked this symposium. I have been a mediator for the Wellington Asbestos Claim
Facility (WACF), mediating disputes between manufacturers and their insurers. The
WACF is the predecessor to the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR). See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Centerfor Claims Resolution, 53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1990); Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The PrivateManagement of a PublicProblem, 33 CL.v. ST. L. RFv. 375 (198485). I am currently serving as an arbitrator in the Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust litigation. See Georgene Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: ParadigmLost (or Found)t, 61
FoRDIAm L. REV. 617 (1992); see also Kenneth Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trus
53 IAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990). As a practicing lawyer, I served most often as a
plaintiffs' lawyer and used the class action device most often in institutional (prison and
welfare) reform and employment discrimination cases. I teach and write about legal ethics, and I have spent most of my legal career (as a law professor, practicing attorney, and
third party neutral) teaching, writing and practicing on issues having to do with settlement,
negotiation, and achieving what I call "quality solutions" to difficult legal problems. As a
clinical teacher I facilitate students and lawyers in learning how to counsel clients and
negotiate with other parties in disputes and transactions.
The specific issues implicated in mass tort class action settlements raise very significant
general issues about the ethics of settlements. This forces me to combine my scholarly
questions with the observations I have made as a participant in some of these cases. As I
suggested in Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticism of Clinical LegalEducation:
Dilemmas and Directionsin LartyeringEducation,4 ANrocH LJ. 287 (1988), we have much to
learn from engaged empirical study (such as structured participant observation) in actual
cases, but it is also clear that many of the participants in this symposium (myself included)
may have to confront the problem of how participation and commitment to positions also
leads to potential biases. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HAv. L.
REv. 829 (1990), Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives,1991 DuKE L.J. 413, and Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 TermForeword: Justice Engendered, 101 HIv. L. REv. 10 (1987), for thoughtful discussions about
how our "positionality" affects what we conclude about the world. It is because I have been
involved in the contextual complexity of these cases that I could not sign a brief that expressed more abstract and general positions.
I must thank those who contributed in one way or another to my ongoing thinking on
these difficult issues and who read or commented on various drafts: Robert Meadow,
Laura Macklin, Wendy White, Roger Cramton, Geoffrey Hazard, Sam Dash, Susan Koniak,
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"Determining when interests are so adverse that the concurrent representation should not be permitted is often a difficult question."1
INTRODUCTION

The settlement of mass torts through the class action device
presents some difficult and troubling issues, including important
questions of due process, fairness, justice, efficiency, equality, equity,
and ethics. In this context, some of these foundational values conflict
with each other and must be "resolved" by judges who must decide
actual cases. In analyzing the applicable laws and rules (class action
rules, constitutional provisions, and ethics rules) we find answers or
suggestions that are often ambiguous or contradictory. All of these
unresolved ambiguities raise the question of whether mass torts are
any different from any number of difficult cases our legal system
3
faces. 2 I do think that mass torts present us with some novel issues
that question the transsubstantivity of our laws and rules. While
others in this symposium focus on the procedural and substantive issues raised by such cases, I will focus on the ethics of such settlements
in two senses: First, at the level of professional ethics, I will examine
what is ethically permissible behavior in the way in which such settlements are arranged. Second, at the higher, broader level of ethics, I
Lisa Heinzerling, Mark Spiegel, Howard Lesnick, Gary Schwartz, and those at the symposium, especially Charles Wolfram and John Leubsdorf who formally commented on the
paper. I also thank the lawyers and special masters in some of the discussed cases for
letting me interview them, both formally and informally. For excellent research assistance,
I thank Sheryl Lincoln.
1 GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAvYERs 621 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added). In Georgine, Geoffrey Hazard testified as an expert on behalf of the settling
parties that there was no conflict of interest in the representation by class counsel of current claimants even though class counsel owed the class of future claimants the duties of a
fiduciary. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 302. Roger Cramton and Susan Koniak, id. at 302-03,
both testified as experts for the objectors that there was a conflict of interest in the concurrent representation of class counsel for the "future claimants" (including those not yet
impaired, as well as those who had not yet filed claims) and current clients of those same
counsel (including an inventory of about 14,000 cases that were settled in some instances
contemporaneously with the negotiations for the class settlement). Thus, the quotation by
a very knowledgeable group of coauthors in their case book not only proved true but prophetic. At least two of the experts, Professors Cramton and Koniak, think their disagreements with Professor Hazard were "mostly factual." Letter from Roger Cramton, Professor
of Law, Cornell Law School, to the author (Nov. 21, 1994) (on file with author); Letter
from Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University Law School (Nov. 26, 1994) (on
file with author).
2 SeeJohn A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Cisis, 80 CoNELL L. REV. 990
(1995).
a And so I disagree with Professors Siliciano, Trangsrud, and Mullenix. Linda S.
Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law: A Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 579 (1994);
Siliciano, supranote 2; Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissen 1989
U. ILL. L. REv.69. But compare Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A
ProposedFederalProcedureAc4 64 Tax. L. Rzv. 1039 (1986); Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing
Choice of Law for Mass Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L.REV. 1623 (1992).
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will examine the nature of an "ethically" just or fair settlement.
Although lawyer ethics are only part of the larger considerations of
what makes a settlement "ethical," the professional responsibility questions raised in recent mass torts cases reveal a bigger problem for legal
ethics generally. This problem involves situations where rules are so
ambiguous or self-contradictory that they cannot govern behavior
4
clearly.
In this Article I hope to explore these ambiguities and dilemmas
by exploring the interests not only of lawyers, but of other participants
in the mass torts cases-victims of harm (whether present or future
claimants),judges, other court adjunct personnel, defendants, including corporations and insurers, and others affected by these cases (for
example, current employees of mass tort "producers"). Exploring
these interests reveals that regulating attorney ethics is not the most
effective way to answer the difficult questions raised by mass tort case
resolution. We probably need to recraft some of our ethics rules (conflicts of interests, attorney client relations, and attorneys' fees) to take
account of new forms of action and representation. We must also,
however, focus on the bigger questions of what constitutes a "just" settlement in our legal system. If living in a mass society5 means we produce mass harms and the need for "mass compensation," we will have
to confront the question of how we can provide fair "mass justice."
This will be a difficult issue for our society, which is based on a culture
of individualistic notions of justice and fairness, to confront. However, judges face this issue often, and as academics we have a duty to
explore it and provide guidance, if only in raising issues that must be
considered. 6
In this Article I will explore some of the interests at stake in these
recent cases, the specific legal ethics issues that have been presented,
4 In other words, when there are good arguments on both sides and distinguished
legal ethicists disagree as they do in these cases, how is a lawyer to decide what to do? Can
ethics "rules" provide clear answers to ethics "problems," or can they only provide aspirations for an "ethical" process of decisionmaking?
5 SeeWijiAM KORNHAUSER, THE PoLrrcs OF MASS SOCIM (1959). Mass torts are the
unfortunate effect of the mass production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services. Even "mass accidents," often treated differently from mass product liability, are
the result of mass transportation systems or exposure of masses of people to objects or
chemicals. It is true that "mass harms" certainly occurred before modem industrialization
(the "plague," fires, shipwrecks, mine accidents, etc.), but it is because modem law is more
willing to treat these as compensable events that mass production causes strains on our
justice system, which is not modeled on "mass" processing principles but on individualism.
Whether we do in fact provide "assembly line" justice in some areas (large caseload criminal law, domestic relations, etc.) is a debatable question. Nevertheless, we still adhere to
the rhetoric and beliefs of a system based on individual justice values.

6 Many, of course, believe that legislatures are the bodies that should deal with these
issues, even if they "delegate" the issue by creating administrative agencies to deal with
mass harms and injuries. See, e.g., Robert L Rabin, Tort System on Triak The Burden of Mass
Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE LJ. 813, 827 (1989).

1162

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1159

and the larger "ethics of settlement" questions that are implicated. I
will then suggest some solutions that point us in the direction of what
might be acceptable mass justice. I believe that both process and substance questions are implicated, and conclude that we must have
either very strong process protections or a deeper scrutiny of substantive outcomes in our settlement processes. We need to consider not
only the procedural and ethical requirements for lawyers and parties,
but also the appropriate level of substantive review our public legal
system should supply for "mass" events that affect the public when
cases are settled in private fora but lawyers and parties seek or require
court approval. 7 When "mass torts" become public events, they entail
public, as well as private, responsibilities.
The Scene.8 FederalDistrict Court, EasternDistrict ofPennsylvania,Philadelphia. Outside of the tallformal air-conditionedcourt building(not in any way
a "house") are two lines ofpicketers, mostly, but not exclusively black men. On
one side they carry signs sportingAFL-CIO labels, "Approve the Settlement."
On the other, a smaller circle carry signs saying "Sell-Out-Reject the Settlement." Early in the morning the cabs start arriving,and the "suits"climb out.
Expensive suits for all, super-millionaireplaintiffs' lawyers, well-heeled corporate lawfirm lawyersfor defendants, manufacturers,producers and insurers, a
few union lawyers, a few government lawyers, some younger and earnest and
not as well dressed public interest lawyers, afew academics-mostly white men,
of various ages and social classes. As lawyers shed their mobile phones at the
security gates, a few former asbestos workers (one in a wheelchair), mostly
shipbuilders, but a variety of others, slowly make their way through the security
gates and enter the elevators. There is little interaction between these groups.
Today is a "law" day-closing arguments will be made. This is not a 'fact"
day-no witnesses will be heard. As the large and spacious courtroom isfilled,
I count close to one hundred suited lawyers in attendance. So many, in fact,
that they sit in the jury box and on their litigationbags in the back. Scattered
in this sea of dark suits and white shirts, the few women lawyers stand out,
though none of them speak this day. The workers, no more than twenty-five of
them, mostly black men, in brightly colored shirts and caps and scruffy shoes,
sit alternately attentively and bored as the lawyers argue. The judge, a distinguished-looking man, walks in and calmly sets the schedule for the rest of the
day. He allocates the scarce resource of time to speak, as he willpreside over the
allocationof scarcefinancialresources to pay injured and diseased workers, an
apparent model ofjudicial temperament, clarity, control, and politeness. A few
members of the press (and at least one academic) grip theirpens and begin to
take notes. In an unusualalignment at counsel table, two of the nation's most
7 See Bank of Am. Natal Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhosue Assoc., 800 F.2d 339
(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that parties seeking court approval of a privately negotiated settlement cannot shield settlement from public access).
8 Closing Argument, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., May 23, 1994.
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successful plaintiffs' lawyers sit next to the partnersof a well-established Washington, D.C. law firm representingtwenty of the most solvent asbestos producers. They are here together to arguefor the approvalof a "globalsettlement" of
future asbestos claims. Sitting at other tables are a few plaintiffs' lawyers
(sometimes collaboratorswith, sometimes competitors of, the plaintiffs' lawyers
for the settlement), a government lawyer, a union lawyer, and a public interest
lawyer. These are the objectors. In the "pews" and in thejury box sit the lawyers
for the hundreds of insurance carriersand other asbestos defendants who will
also, one way or another, be payingfor this settlement or the fallout or "optouts" of it. Also in the courtroom is a local law professorof nationalreputation
who has served as a "specialmaster" to assist the judge in evaluating theformulas of settlement.
The case begins, and Gene Locks, a local Philadelphiacounsel made rich
by years of asbestos litigation,begins by likening himself to Abraham Lincolnthe man who sought justice for "the little guy." Thus begins a full day of
argument in which multiple sets of lawyers, aligned in very different ways in
other cases, will line up on one of the two sides our adversary system requires to
arguefor or against one of the largestand most complex settlements of what we
now call a "mass tort." In this case the settlement,filed as a class action, is of
tens of thousands of asbestos-relatedinjuries and diseases.
At the end of the day Judge Reed will have to confront some of the biggest
challenges to the operation of the legal system any judge has everfaced. He will
have to decide whetherpeople who don't yet have any physical impairment can
be bound to a settlement of theirpotentialfutureclaims, whether they have been
given adequate notice of this settlement, whether the lawyers sitting at counsel
table are "adequaterepresentatives"for people they have never met and whether
the settlement is "fair,adequate, and reasonable." For many of these issues he
will not be guided by any precedent or standards. Indeed, earlierin this courtroom, several of the nation's most distinguishedlegal scholars (and co-authors
of a leading text) have given opposing expert opinions on some of these very
questions. He is not alone infacing these issues. A few weeks laterjudgeSam
Pointer will face a similarset of issues with a more complex array of lawyers,
claimants, scientists, and experts in Birmingham, Alabama as he confronts the
settlement of breast implant litigation.9 Neither of these judges is totally
alone-otherjudges have had to face similar challenges,'0 if in somewhat different forms.1" These judges know what it means to see the law as a "seamless
9 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming
Corp.) Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994) (approval of settlement).
10 Judge Jack Weinstein has recently dealt with some similar issues in the most recent
round of the Johns Manville Trust and bankruptcy. See In rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos
Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
11 I will not recount the facts (and now first round of published opinions) in these
cases as they are well canvassed by others in this symposium. I will merely refer to those
issues presented that bear on my own topic-the ethics of settlement.
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web." These cases ask them to decide issues involving the facts and law of
procedure, torts, ethics, contracts, agency, labor, and bankruptcy-all of these
bodies of law entwined with each other in ways not contemplated by the people
who drafted them.
The Stakes: For the people in this room, the stakes are enormous. Millions of
dollars will be allocated to different groups of injured workers. Millions of
dollars will be allocated to the small group of lawyers who process their claims
and represent them. There arefears that those dollars will not be enough to
compensatefor the life-ending diseases suffered by thousands, perhapsmillions,
of workers. Corporationsand insurers hope to cap those dollars allocated to
this problem and move their resources on to other "productive"uses. Precedents
will be set by this case that could affect potentially millions of other similarly
harmed people. These are the hard "fact" issues and stakes.
For many in the room, andfor millions of people not in the room, there are
other stakes-the "law" issues and the consequences and effects of this case and
decisionfor cases like it andfor the justice system as a whole. These law issues
include deciding who should payfor what injuries,harms, and misfortunes we
suffer; what processes should be used to determine these issues; who should
represent us and how should they be paid; how should we decide who gets paid;
what shouldjudges and courts be doing; how should claimants, clients, lawyers, judges, and other third party "neutrals"behave toward each other. In
short, how can our legal system provide justice for all when there may not be
enough justice to go around?
I
THE ISSUES AND QUESTIONS: 12 WHAT IS AN ETHicAL
SETLEMENT?

Mass tort class action settlements raise a host of ethical issues on
both macro justice levels and more micro lawyer behavioral levels. In
considering whether a settlement is "ethical," fair, orjust' s we are con12 At the symposium the commentators suggested that I asked too many questions
and provided very few answers. To this I plead guilty. As an academic ethicist, I see scores
of unanswerable issues and dilemmas raised by these cases. As a practitioner (formerly as
an advocate, now as a third party neutral, always as a clinical teacher), I know we must
answer these questions. Thus, I will offer some solutions at the end, but I think it is
important to recognize that we are, as Robert Rabin suggested, "midstream" in our
working out of these problems and issues in mass tort litigation. See Robert L. Rabin,
Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Mass Toxic Harm Cases: A Comment, 80 CoRN.LL L.
REV. 1037, 1044 (1995). Thus, I offer questions and issues to guide our consideration of
the factors that need to be confronted as we attempt to craft solutions to these difficult
problems. Judges must judge and frame questions that can be "judged"-academics can
raise deep, if more intractable, issues that we must deliberate about before we can fully
answer the questions.
13 These are not equivalents. They are likely to lead to different standards, both as
philosophers would define them and as legal standards would regulate them.
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cerned with the process by which the settlement was reached 14 (including who the negotiators were and how they conducted
themselves) and the fairness of the outcome. Our laws (substantive,
procedural, and ethical) are, in general, remarkably silent on these
issues. They prefer to treat most negotiations as matters of private ordering 15 with little public scrutiny. 16 Whether or not one agrees with
the distinctions drawn between private negotiations and actions taken
in more publicly scrutinized litigation, it is clear to me that recent
developments in the use of alternative dispute resolution,'17 increased
judicial management of cases,' 8 and the encouragement of settlement
in general' 9 have resulted in a hybrid of private and public settlement
processes that present us with the question of what standards to apply.20 While these issues will be confronted in a wide variety of indi14 This may implicate constitutional issues of due process in some cases. See Phillips
Petroleum v. Stutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (including potentially troublesome state action
issues ifjudges and other court personnel become "involved" in settlements).
15 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rule Making, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1976).
16 By now many commentators have written about and decried the lack of regulation
of negotiation and its treatment as private ordering, especially when ethical rules prescribe
some rules for actions taken in a courtroom. See, e.g., Eleanor H. Norton, Bargainingand
the Ethic of Process,64 N.Y.U. L. R-v. 493 (1989); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerieon Lawyers'Ethics
in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975); Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations: Are
There Any? (ALI-ABA, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF REAL ESTATE IWvvRs, 1994); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REv. 1219 (1990).
17 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjury Litigation: A Sodo-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK,. L. REV. 961 (1993); Mark A. Peterson & Molly
Selvin, MassJustice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of Courts, 54 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoas.
227 (1991).
18 See CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. V 1993) ;Judith Resnik,
ManagerialJudges,96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, ManagerialJudges].
19 See Stephen M. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HAsTINGS L.J. 1 (1992); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: JudicialPromotionand
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in An Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted, or "The Law of ADR, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Forand Against Settlement]. Settlement is "encouraged" in our system for different
reasons. These include what I and others have labeled "quantitative-efficiency" grounds
(docket clearing) or "qualitative-faimess" grounds (producing solutions that are either
more Pareto optimal than limited court resolutions or that are more "creative" or varied
than what courts may be authorized to do. Pareto optimal solutions are those in which
joint gains have been maximized, and no party could benefit any more without making
another party worse off. See HoWARD RAIFFA, THE ART OF SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139

(1982). Mass tort class action settlements are designed to meet both of these elements of
settlement20 Is a mediation session conducted in a courthouse a matter before a "tribunal" so
that rules of candor to the tribunal would apply?, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr
Rule 3.3 (1993) [hereinafter MODEL RULES], or is it a private negotiation?, MODEL RULES,

supra, Rule 4.1. Is an early neutral evaluation proceeding ordered by the court but occurring in a private law office governed by court and litigation ethics rules or the more permissive private negotiation rules?
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vidual cases, the recent spate of mass tort cases raises these issues
dramatically because of the large numbers of people affected by the
settlements reached, and because the processes and legal issues dealing with mass torts are particularly complex.2 1 What should the ethics
rules or standards be in the negotiation and settlement of individual
cases, class actions, and mass torts (or other particular substantive areas22 )? Should our standards depend on the public or private nature
of the activity (where the negotiation is conducted and who it affects),
how many people are affected (whether there is an individual action
with a fully represented party or a class action in which clients never
meet their lawyers), or what kind of a case or legal issue is involved
(the substance of the dispute or transaction)? Thus, while we consider the specifics of the ethics of settlements of mass tort class actions, these cases force us to consider more "meta-ethical" concerns in
legal ethics-is it possible to have transsubstantive ethical rules in
legal practice or must our rules be process (negotiation vs. litigation)
or substance (do crimes and injuries to the person suggest different
rules than injuries to objects or property2 3 ) sensitive? The issues
presented in the class action settlement of mass torts thus present an
important case study of what happens when the rules meet the road,
and our attempts at abstract rulemaking do not adequately guide our
24
efforts to solve real world problems.
21 Other articles in this symposium have addressed the issue of whether mass torts are
any different from other torts. See Siliciano, supranote 2; Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An
InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective,80 CORNELL L. REv. 941 (1995). This issue is also implicated in the question of the ethics of settlement with which this paper is concerned-do
mass torts present such a special case that they require special ethics rules? SeeJack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Ray. 469, 471 (1994); see
also Geoffrey Hazard, Reflections on Judge Weinstein's EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 569, 570 (1994). Or, the question could be put at the procedural, not
substantive level: Do class action settlements require different ethical rules than individual
settlements? Under what circumstances do we ever scrutinize the effects of individual case
settlements? (only when there are claims of fraud, unconscionability, or in other very limited circumstances).
22 As a result of some other complex and troubling moments in our legal history,
such as the savings and loan crisis and the junk bond crisis, some commentators have
suggested that we need specific ethical rules in those areas as well. See George H. Brown,
FinancialInstitution Lawyers as Quasi-PublicEnforcers,7 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 637 (1994); Ted
Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporation: What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulations of Lawyers, 35 So. Tax. L. Ruv. 639 (1994); Stanley Sporkin, The Need forSeparate Codes
of Professional Conductfor Various Specialties, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 149 (1993).
23 This distinction is made in the permissibility of disclosure of client confidences to
prevent bodily harm, but not, in most states, to prevent economic fraud, see MODEL RULES,
supra note 20, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
24 For me the intellectual attraction of this project was to test my more abstract views
as a strict legal ethicist (arguing for strong enforcement of conflicts of interests rules, for
example) against the needs of "the real world" to find fair and efficient solutions to the
problems of compensation and redress for the millions of people harmed by our modem
technological world. Throughout the symposium, lawyers and judges who participated in
the cases we write about tried to remind us of the constraints and realities of the real world
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In canvassing the complex ethical and legal issues of mass tort
settlements, I hope to suggest some principles or bases from which we
can determine when settlement is appropriate and how settlements
25
can be made to be as just as possible.
In the most recent mass torts class action settlements, "ethics" became an issue in the specific context of whether, under Federal Rule
23(a) (4),26 class counsel were "adequate" to represent the classes of
litigants. These classes comprised, depending on the specifics of the
litigation, present clients, potential future claimants, domestic claimants, foreign claimants, and a variety of other groups. Objections
were raised to class counsel claiming, among other things: (1) that
they had conflicts of interests (which violated the state equivalents of
Model Rule 1.7(b)) in representing classes of clients and claimants
with different interests; 27 (2) that they colluded with defense counsel
to reach a settlement 28 (presumably in violation of their duties to zealously advocate for their clients2 9); (3) that they have conflicts of interas we debated different approaches to these problems. Sociologically speaking, we are all
products of our occupational choices-academics, judges, and lawyers-and these positions or ("points of view") clearly affect the ways in which we seek to solve the problems
presented here.
25 For many, the baseline of fairness of settlements is what would happen if the case
were tried. In mass tort cases this cannot be the standard: Well over 90% of all cases settle
and many mass torts cases result injury verdicts for the defense (resulting in a base of zero
for the individual plaintiff). Furthermore, some evidence suggests that defense verdicts are
increasing in torts cases. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Juiy or
judge: TranscendingEmpiricism,77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124 (1992); see also Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Tria; 90 MicH. L. REv. 319 (1991).
26
FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(4).
27
Most commentators consider these "concurrent" conflicts under MODEL RuLjS,
supranote 20, Rule 1.7. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, FeastingWhile the Widow Weeps: Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).
28 For a statement of the law on collusion in settlements, see In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 207 (5th Cir. 1981) (collusion established by scrutiny of the settlement terms).
29
The Model Rules have formally dropped the duty to be "zealous." They now require counsel to be "diligent." MODEL RuLEs, supranote 20, Rule 1.3. "Zeal" is retained,
however, in the comments. Id. cmt. 16. The exact legal framework for analyzing collusion
remains somewhat murky and is related to the larger justice of settlement issues I raise
here. Some commentators claim that lawyers have "sold out" the class, acted in bad faith
or have committed fraud, either by not negotiating the same deal for similarly situated
claimants or for receiving a "premium" in attorneys' fees for compromising class members'
settlement values. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The
New Technology of Collusion, 80 CoRmEL L. REV. 851 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Summary];
Koniak, supranote 27. The latter criticism actually reflects another conflict of interest: the
conflict every lawyer-client relationship presents in how fee structures affect the lawyer's
work habits. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark? 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 47 (1989); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic
Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 L-w & Soc. REv. 341 (1987) [hereinafter
Kritzer, Fee Arrangements]; Herbert M. Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality... Uses and Abuses...
Contingencies and Certainties: The PoliticalEconomy of the American Contingent Fee, GEo. LJ.
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ests when serving in the dual capacity of monitors or auditors of the
claims processing while simultaneously representing claimants within
the claims process (thus granting them access to "inside information"
not available to other claimant's counsel3 0 ); (4) that they violated
Model Rule 5.6 by agreeing to limitations on their practice when they
agreed to advise all future claimants to follow the standards of the
settlement criteria; and (5) that they agreed to aggregate settlements
of concurrent clients in violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(g). In addition to these explicit and formal ethical issues, several other ethics issues lurk beneath the surfaces of these
cases and have generally not been raised by the parties or fully explored by the courts. These include the appropriate counseling of
clients as to acceptance of settlement offers3 ' or offers to become class
representatives 3 2-in short, issues relating to the content and form of
33
the attorney-client relationship.
In assessing the fairness of a class action settlement under Rule
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts must also consider broader "ethics" questions. By what standards, for instance,
should a court measure the fairness of a settlement?3 The few judges
who have confronted the "ethics of settlement" in the mass tort context have had little to guide them except ajurisprudence and an ethics code that generally shun substantive review of bargaining.3 5 Thus,
(forthcoming 1995) (Conference on Law and Economics of Litigation Reform May 7,
1994) [hereinafter Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality]; Herbert M. Kritzer et al.,
Understandingthe
Costs of Litigation: The Case of the Hourly FeeLauyer, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 559;Jonathan
R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and RecommendationsforReform, 58 U. Cm.L.REv. 1 (1991).
30
This conflict probably stems from legal obligations created under agency and fiduciary law and from the prohibitions in MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rules 1.7, 1.8 (forbidding a lawyer's "other interests" from conflicting with their representational interests).
31

See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.8(g); MODEL CODE OF PROFESEC 7-7 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].

SIONAL RrsPONSIBILrry

32 The choice of class representatives and how they were "recruited" to the litigation
involves not only counseling issues. It has, in past class action litigation (although probably
not in this particular case), raised issues of solicitation as well. See MODEL RuLEs, supranote
20, Rule 7.1. What constitutes solicitation of clients remains a complicated question involving both state ethics law (and continuing attempts to prohibit certain forms of in-person
solicitation) and federal constitutional law. When an attorney advises potential clients of
their legal rights, that communication implicates the First Amendment, in which case federal law trumps state law. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 486 U.S. 466 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978).
3
Judge Weinstein calls these the "communication" issues between attorney and client. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 493.
34 See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1975).
35

As more fully discussed infratext accompanying notes 208-24, the law has tradition-

ally refused to scrutinize most substantive contractual bargains, collective bargaining agreements (the duty to bargain is a process not a substantively enforced right, see cases under
§ 8(a) (5) and (b) (3) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), e.g.,
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d
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courts assess settlements principally from a process perspective.3 6 The
Georgine court, for example, stated that "this court may have more confidence in the fairness of a settlement... negotiated by experienced
counsel [who engage] in a long, deliberative process."37 Judges assessing the fairness of settlements in mass torts are clearly affected by the
complexity of the issues, and by the difficult and important social and
judicial context in which mass torts are situated. So, as Judge Reed
says in Georgine,"the settlement must be evaluated in light of the practical realities of the litigation from which the settlement arose."38
Judges evaluating mass tort class action settlements under Rule 23(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus scrutinize the deal only to
be sure that the deal appears to give the claimants something they
would not have otherwise received. This reflects the age-old notion
that a good negotiated result is one that leaves all the parties
unhappy.3 9
564 (5th Cir. 1958); see generalyArchibald Cox, The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith,71 HARv.
L REv. 1401 (1958)), and legal settlements generally. Efforts to require lawyers to act candidly in negotiations and to discipline lawyers for entering into unconscionable settlements
were defeated in debates about the Kutak Ethics Committee's original draft of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. SeeMODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6,4.1,
4.2 (proposed official draft 1983); CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, THE LEGISLATIVE HISrORY OF THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR

DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1987); Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism
as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of ProfesionalConduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
677 (1989); see also Murray Schwartz, The Professionalismand Accountability ofLauroers, 66 CAL.
L. REv. 4 (1978) (arguing that lawyers should be more accountable for what they do
outside of court than what they do in the presence of ajudge in litigation);JamesJ. White,
Machiavelli and the Bar EthicalLimits on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 Am.B. FouND. RES.J. 926
(arguing that we cannot hold lawyers to a standard of candor or unconscionability in negotiations because such activities are private and not measurable). For a recent argument that
we cannot assess what goes on in the "black box of settlement," see Geoffrey Hazard, The
Black Box Of Settlemen4 Lecture delivered at Boston University Law School (Oct. 27, 1994).
36 See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73-76 (2d Cir. 1983).
37
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 322.
38 Id.at 321.
39 Judge Reed, like other judges assessing settlements, viewed the Georgine settlement
as fair because it represented a "compromise." Id. at 320-21 (citing In re Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1887 (D. Ariz. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Class
Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992)). At the symposium, Professor
Coffee said he understood the lack of dissatisfaction on the part of the settling parties in
Georgineas indication of a "collusive" settlement. In a good negotiated settlement, he said,
both parties are unhappy. For arguments that this is an outmoded concept of successful
negotiation, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WrrTHoUT GIvING IN (2d ed. 1991); DAVID A. LAX &JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETVE GAIN (1986); HOwARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
Modem negotiation theory suggests that we can find Pareto optimal settlements in which
both parties need not "compromise" everything nor feel dissatisfaction with the deal. Perhaps in the next round of mass tort settlement litigation, negotiation theorists will be
called as experts to testify as to what standards should be applied in considering what is a
good and fair (and high "quality") settlement.
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These recent questions raise a variety of general concerns about
assessing the ethics of settlements in mass torts:
1. What guidance, if any, do the ethical rules for lawyers provide
for assessing the propriety of lawyer behavior in negotiating mass tort
class action settlements?
2. Is it possible to develop transsubstantive ethical rules that apply across all areas of practice or do ethical considerations come in
contextual packages, necessitating more detailed and context-sensitive
rules?

40

3. What are the ethics of settlement and to whom should they
apply? This includes an assessment of the ethics of the process by
which parties reach settlements, that is, the ethics of negotiation 4 as
well as the "ethics" or 'Justice" of the outcome.4 2 Must we alter our
40 I am on record (not in the scholarly literature, but in the Los Angeles and California press) as opposing most forms of conflictual representation in the entertainment industry even as entertainment lawyers argue vociferously for "special treatment" for their
particular, specialized practice of being "lawyers for the deal." See Corie Brown, That's
Entertainment CAL. LAw., June 1993, at 38; Alan Citron & Robert W. Welkos, The Pope of
Hollywood: Ziffren's Representation of Studios, Stars is Challenged, LA TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992 at
D1. For discussions of conflicts of interest in legal representation, see GEoFFREy C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D.
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965) (commenting on the ethical problems made apparent during Brandeis's appointment to the Supreme Court); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal
Ethics of RadicalIndividualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963, 967 (1987) (arguing for a lawyer for the
community). Are mass torts cases different? Should conflicts of interest rules differ for
various practice environments? Judge Weinstein has begun to lay the groundwork for substance-based ethical variations. See Weinstein, supra note 21. The Model Rules already
recognize some forms of "contextual ethics" in providing different standards for prosecutors, lawyers for indigents, and government lawyers. See MODEL Rur.ES, supra note 20, Rules
3.8, 1.8(e) (2), 1.11 (allowing legal services attorneys to finance litigation costs and providing special rules by which former government lawyers screen clients). For recent arguments that banking and securities lawyers should operate under different standards of
disclosure, see Brown, supra note 22 (proposing a mandatory disclosure system in which
the traditional lawyer-client confidentiality rules would be eased). A variety of groups have
promulgated different ethics standards for categories of lawyers, see ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice; American Academy of Family Mediators,
Standards for Mediators, SEC Rules; Disreputable Conduct, 31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (1994); cf
Fred Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility Codes: Theory, Practiceand the Paradigm
of ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993).
41 See, e.g., Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99
(1982); Eleanor H. Norton, Bargainingand theEthic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (1989);
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REV. 1219 (1990). These
articles virtually all assume that the ethics of negotiation are vested in counsel. There are
few explorations of the ethical obligations that clients have to each other. See, e.g., Stare v.
Tate, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Ct. App. 1971) (contracts case in which husband informed wife
that his lawyer had taken advantage of her lawyer's error in divorce negotiation); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1518 (1986) (examining
lawyer's duty to correct error in submitted contract without consulting client).
42 Some scholars have taken up the complex philosophical question of whether it is
ever "just"or ethical to settle a claim or compromise a legal right. See, e.g., COMPROMISE IN
ETHICS, LAw AND POLTICS (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1979); RobertJ.
Condin, Bargainingin the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lavyer Dispute BargainingRoe
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ideals of individualjustice to deal with a world in which technology and
modernity bring mass harms that may require aggregatejustice?
4. As in any law-making activity, what relationship exists between
rule and experience, standard and discretion? Can we craft, in advance, rules or standards that will meet the challenges of rapid technological and legal change? 43
5. Wo owes duties to whom in considering the ethics of mass torts
settlements? Do clients and potential claimants ("fellow" victims) owe
duties to each other to bring their claims in a mutually responsible
way?44 Do judges and their assistants, such as third party neutrals and
special masters, have special duties with respect to the settlement of
such claims?45 Can we craft ethical rules for classes of people who
51 MD. L. REv. 1 (1992); RobertJ. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides": Patterns of Argument in
Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REv. 85 (1985) [hereinafter Condlin, "Cases on Both
Sides"]; David Luban, Ethics of Settlement, Bargainingand Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and InformalJustice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. Are. 397 (1985).
43 On one hand, the adaptation of the class action form to mass tort settlements is a
slow process. Early courts rejected class treatment in mass tort cases. See, e.g., In re Dalkon
Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). More recently, class actions in mass torts have gained approval and acceptance. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d. 709 (4th Cir. 1989). Commentators speculate that this acceptance occurred
when defendants began to seek, rather than resist, class action treatment. See Coffee, Summary, supranote 29, 851-52. On the other hand, the adaptation of class actions to mass
torts has been a fast process when we consider how quickly we have come from the 1966
determination that mass torts were inappropriate for class action treatments. SeeJudith
Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation,"LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Resnik, "Cases" to "Litigation"]. Lawyers and other actors are quick to adapt to legal
rules and create new forms to solve old problems. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (Political Action Committee adaptations to campaign finance reform). SeeJudge
Schwarzer's attempt to specify clear standards for class action settlement approvals in his
proposed new Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. William W. Schwarzer,
Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CoRNLL L. REv. 837 (1995).
44 Our legal system has privileged the "first come, first served" rule in many contexts:
first to the courthouse, first to record the deed, first to file a security interest, first to
convert the property to use, etc. Susan Koniak finds the first-come basis of our litigation
system to be random and therefore more "just" than non-random prioritization such as the
deferment of pleural thickening claims. See Koniak, supranote 27, at 1079-80 n.162. For
different views about the justice of ordering of claims, see Peter H. Schuck, The Worst
Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 541
(1992); Weinstein, supra note 21 (referring to the loss of claims of later arrivals to the
Manville Trust). These authors argue for communitarian ethics in which similarly injured
people think of themselves as comprising a group requiring some form of solidarity in
efforts to collect damages. I realize it is heretical to suggest that some principle other than
individual first come, first served should form the basis for gaining relief in our legal system, or that an individual rights-based system like ours could contemplate a "client's code
of ethics."
45 Some commentators suggest that when judges actively engage in the facilitation of
settlements, they should refer the class action settlement fairness hearing to anotherjudge.
See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (referral by
Judge Charles Weiner of fairness hearing to Judge Reed); Day v. National Lead, 864 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (order transferring review of fairness of settlement on ground
that presiding judge had participated actively in the settlement); S. Arthur Spiegel, Settling
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may have very different interests? 46 Which interests are protected by
currently existing rules? 47 By those we might draft?
6. Finally, who should make the rules, judgments, and policies
that will enforce standards of ethics or justice in this area: judges,
legislators, expert witnesses, crafty (meant positively) lawyers, professors, ethics committees, corporate executives, financiers, insurance actuaries, or victims? 48
This Article presents a simple argument: The current ethical rules
on conflicts of interests, limitation of practice, and ethics in negotiation and
litigation (although they appear to deal with the general issues of law practice)
were not drafted with the special issues of mass tort class action settlements in
mind, and do not, in my view, provide adequateguidancefor how these issues
should be resolved. Our legal system, and ethical rules, must confront the tensions between our ideals of individualjustice and the reality of a need for
"aggregate"justice.
Our current rules do not provide adequate guidance for resolving these issues, either at the system level or at the individual case
level. I have no easy answers to any of the questions I will raise here. I
only hope to describe some of the problems, interests, and issues; elucidate what the important principles and values should be in our system ofjustice and ethics; and then offer some suggestions for reform.
In my view, the settlements of mass torts raise ethical issues of a
different magnitude and quality than those raised by the idealized version of individual attorney-client representation on which the current
rules are based. Two forms of romanticism4 9 have created our rules:
litigationromanticism5 ° and romanticism about the individual attorney-client
Class Actions, 62 U. CIN. L. REy. 1565 (1994); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks
with Neutrals: ADR Hazards, 12 ALTENATivEs 109 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter Ex Parte Talks];
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ProfessionalResponsibilityfor Third Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES
129 (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter Third Party Neutrals].
46 Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STA. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
47 Legal profession scholars have studied the political, economic, and class interests
that drive ethics rulemaking. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthical
Rules?, 59 TEx. L. R-v. 639 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689 (1981); Schneyer, supra note 35; David
B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lauyers?, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 801 (1992).
48 It is ironic that in the area of mass tort settlements judges are criticized for fashioning legislative-like solutions without authority in an area where Congress has not acted. See
Mullenix, supra note 3; Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1004-05; Schuck, supranote 21, at 941. At
the same time, Congress is criticized for usurping judicial power in regulating civil procedure in the CivilJustice Reform Act. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin Procedural Justice, 77 Mwn'. L. Rsv. 375 (1993); Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation:
EvaluatingProposalsfor Change, 59 BRooK. L. REv. 659 (1993).
49 I do not mean to use this term pejoratively. I consider myself a romantic about a
number of things, our legal system being one of them. But to continue to love an idea or
institution realistically we need to see the object of our love as it really is.
50 See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra note 18. Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. RE%'. 494 (1986);Judith Resnik, "Cases" to "Litigation,"
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relationship.51 In order to maintain our commitment to justice and
ethics in our legal system we need to confront the realities of the situations that test our rules. Exposure to the ethics of mass tort settlement will inform us not only how to judge the ethics of mass tort
settlements but also whether we may need to change our rules in
52
other areas as well.

II
THE INTERESTS: WHO CARES ABOUT THE

ETHics

OF

SETTLEMENT?

One of the difficulties in crafting or interpreting rules of ethics in
these cases is that attempts to create rules flexible enough to deal with
a variety of situations results in the kind of rule ambiguity that allows
adversary argument and interpretation to flourish. Thus, even experts
will differ on the meanings and significance of words, and the players
will have different interpretations based on where they are situated in
the case. The class action settlements of mass torts provide one of
those environments with a multiplicity of interest groups53 and

enough ambiguity of language to provide rich and conflicting argument. What makes the interest groups in these cases so interesting is
that they no longer (if they ever did) fit simple cleavages between
plaintiffs and defendants or lawyers and clients. Interests in the settlement of mass torts divide the parties, divide the bar (including those
on the same "side"), divide the experts (this is more usual), and will
likely also divide the judicial decisionmakers. These new issues and
supranote 43; Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL L. REv. 1 (1987);
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L REv.
631, 650 (1994).
51 See DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, ATroRNEY-Cu'rr: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1973); Mark Spiegel, Lawyers and ClientDecisionmaking. Informed Consent and the LegalProfession, 128 U. PA. L.
Ray. 41 (1979).

52 Class actions are not the only forms that raise these ethical issues. Other forms of
consolidation or multiple-client representation raise issues involving communication and
conflicts of interests. Legal services lawyers have long faced the issue of lawyer rationing, if
not in fees, then in time. See Gary Bellow &Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice,58 B.U. L.REv. 337 (1978); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow & Robert Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services: Individual Attorney
Decisions in Work Priorities,5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 237 (1983); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethicfor Legal Services Practice,37 UCLA L. Rv.1101 (1990). Settlements of
inventories of cases or "bulk" settlements (with allocation by plaintiff's counsel of money
paid to plaintiffs), criminal plea bargains of repeat play defender-prosecutors, and entertainment and sports lawyers negotiating on behalf of separate but multiple clients with
scarce resources (time in TV programming, salary caps for teams) all raise issues of concurrent client conflicts as well as attorney-client communication issues.
53 For other thorough reviews of the interests implicated in mass tort litigation, see
generally JACK B. WEmSEIN, INDrviDUALJusTicE iN MASS TORT LrIGATION (1995); Mark
Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of Courts, 54 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1991).
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new alignments provide a kind of "postmodem" perspective on legal
ethics-the "centers" of interests will not hold long enough for us to
craft clear rules. In dealing with the uncertainties of how successful
ihe settlements will actually be, we cannot see clearly enough to make
predictive statements of what good lawyering behavior should be.
Before reviewing my own analysis of what the ethics of settlement
here should be, I will briefly review the varied interests of the "participants" in these class action settlements.
A.

The Claimants: Injured People

Those harmed by products, accidents, services, chemical substances, and other forms of modem "exposures" are not all similarly
situated. Whether or not mass torts are different from other torts in
how they are processed through the legal system, it is clear that not all
mass torts are alike and not all mass torts victims are harmed in the
same ways. Thus, those that are injured as a result of a "mass accident" 5 4 have discrete events causing their injuries, even if their injuries may be varied. Those harmed by medical or industrial products,
drugs, or chemicals such as silicone gel breast implants, Dalkon
Shields, DES, asbestos, toxic wastes, and now, electromagnetic fields,55
may suffer more gradual injuries such as cancers, reproductive disorders, and auto-immune diseases that may take time to manifest and
may cause psychological harm in the fear and anticipation that such
conditions may develop. Some injuries are life threatening (and in
the case of heart valve failure may cause rapid death) and others are
long lasting and partially debilitaive. 5 6 Some may already know of
their exposure and injury; others may know of their exposure but not
their injury; others may not even know of their exposure to possible
harms that could lead to liability. Some have ready access to counsel
57
or others who can advise them (like unions, physicians, the media )
54 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 929 (1983) (restaurant fire); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.),
vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (hotel disaster);JAMas S.
KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION

(1988).

See, e.g., Eileen Abt, Coping With the Risk of Cancerin ChildrenLiving NearPowerLines,
5 RiS, HEALTH, SAFEWR
& EM"T 65 (1994); Ann Bostrom et al., Preferencefor Exposure Control
of Power-Frequency Fields Among Lay Opinion Leaders, 5 RIsK, HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 4
(1994); Edward Gerjuoy, ElectromagneticFields: Physics, Biology and the Law, 35JuRiMETcsJ.
55 (1994); Roy Krieger & Michael Witney, EMF and the PublicHealth, 9 NAT'L RESOURCES &
ENV'T 3 (1994).
56
Infertility caused by the Dalkon Shield may be permanent and not life threatening,
but the psychological and emotional harm (stemming from the absence of children or loss
of marriage) can be devastating.
57
There may be a significant difference between access to "notice" such as coverage
in the media and someone who can give advice or counsel, such as doctors, lawyers, and
union representatives. Access to information in our society, like most things, is related to
social class.
55
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and others may not have access to information about their injuries (as
is the case with some of the foreign claimants who have been "exposed" to American products or chemicals).
There are also the families of injured parties who, depending on
state law, may or may not have claims against the producers of harmful products. Some were exposed while working for the government,
as in the military service of Agent Orange victims, or for public or
governmental purposes, as the shipbuilders in the Brooklyn Navy yard
who aided the World War II effort; others worked in private companies or were engaged in the extremely "private" enterprise of child
bearing. 58 Others may simply have been at the wrong place at the
wrong time (e.g., living in houses located near toxic waste dumps or
electromagnetic fields before we knew the dangers involved).
Increasingly, claimants have expanded to an ever larger number
of people included in the penumbras of harm caused by modern
life. 59 In the asbestos cases one hears of primary (workers), secondary
(family members), and now tertiary (neighborhoods) layers of exposure and claims against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos
materials and products. 60 Recently, the largest settlement to date of
property damage claims provided for settlements of replacement costs
of pipes to households, including those who might suffer plumbing
problems in the future from defective plastic plumbing. 61 In addi58 The gender-related differences in the treatment of mass torts have begun to gain
some attention. See Leslie Bender, A Laroyer'sPrimeron Feminist Theory and Torts,38J. LEGAL
EDUC. 8 (1988); Leslie Bender, An Overview ofFeminist Torts Scholarship,78 CORNELL L. REV.
575 (1993); Leslie Bender, Changingthe Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA LJ. 759 (1990); Leslie
Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE LJ. 848; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in
a Torts Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989). Women may suffer harms differentially
recognized by the legal system. SeeRobin L. West, The Difference in Women's HedonicLives: A
PhenomenologicalCritiqueofFeminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S LJ.81 (1987). This raises
issues about how "mass torts" are created, defined, and legally recognized. Is the failure to
provide safe and lighted facilities a "mass tort" against women who are assaulted and raped
differentially from men? For an argument that women's childbearing should be recognized as an act of "citizenship" similar to men's soldiering, see CAROLE PATEMAN, DISORDERLY WOMEN:
DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (1989); FEMINIST
INTERPRETATION AND POLITICAL THEORY (Carole Pateman & Mary Shanley eds., 1991). This
could become relevant if we consider the locus of injury as a significant factor in compensation schemes.
59 This inspired one television program called The Blame Game: Is Eveiyone a Victim?
(ABC television broadcast, Special Report, Oct. 25, 1994) (illustrating laws and lawyers that
"encourage" lawsuits by increasing the classes of "protected persons" in a variety of areas
including employment, products liability, and defamation).
60

See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDucT. THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON

TRIAL (1985); B. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (2d ed. 1986).

61 Maryann Haggerty & Ann Mariano, PlasticPipe Settlement Reached: Finns to Pay At
Least $750 Million to Cover Home Water Damages, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at Al. This
settlement has just been disallowed by the court. Maryann Haggerty, Settlement is Thrown
Out in Suit Over PlasticPipes, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1995, at Fl.
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tion, when mass torts cause companies to seek the "protection" of
bankruptcy, some have argued that a further class of claimants is created in the current employees and other creditors of such companies
who will lose jobs, money, and other benefits as a result of reorganizations or full-scale liquidations. Finally, if one considers other users of
the legal system displaced by the massive volumes of mass tort cases,
then those "harmed" by mass torts includes those members of the
public whose access to the legal system is impaired by the resources,
62
legal services, and personnel utilized for these cases in lieu of others.
Given the different classes of claimants, there are a wide variety of
objectives such claimants will hope to achieve from a lawsuit. Some
will want immediate financial compensation; some will want vindication and the right to a public trial and denouncement or punishment
of the "evil wrongdoers;" others will want privacy or insurance-like
protections of available cash or medical monitoring and treatment
should diseases manifest themselves; some want quick resolutions
(particularly those who are dying); and others prefer longer litigation
until the extent of their full injuries are known. Thus, the problem of
63
class treatment and class settlement of such claims is evident.
Although questions of law and fact may be similar in large numbers
of cases (causation, epidemiology of the applicable disease), other
facts (which manufacturer, exposure) may not be subject to group
treatment and the interests and needs of the claimants for particular
6
remedies may or may not be similar or "gridable." 4

62 In this sense, any lawsuit's use of the legal system displaces other possible uses.
Thus it is only the "mass" aspects of these tort cases that makes them any different than
other cases, in terms of the effects of caseload displacement of access to the legal system.
Whether the large number of mass tort cases have a disproportionate impact on delay
nationally, or discretely in different districts, also raises questions of disparate treatments of
different litigants. For an analysis of equilibria in caseloads, see George L Priest, Private
Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L REv. 527 (1989) (suggesting that if
particular state courts or federal districts have large numbers of mass torts cases, delay will
be longer in those districts and may serve as a disincentive for filing lawsuits in those
courts).
63 This explains why the drafters and revisers of FED. R. Crv. P. 23 did not think "mass
accidents" would be appropriately handled through the class action device. Memorandum
of Benjamin Kaplan, Advisory Committee, 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 cited in Resnik,
supra note 43.
64 See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative? 13 CARDozo L. Rrv. 1819 (1992) (arguing for an administrative solution to
widely varying jury verdicts and unpredictable settlements in asbestos cases). Whether
some mass torts are more susceptible than others to schedules of benefits or "grids" like
those employed in social security disability and worker's compensation determinations remains to be seen. See grids established in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp.), Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No.
926, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (discussing the Schedule of Benefits and Disease Schedule attached to the Settlement Notice).
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On what basis should competing or dissimilar interests of claimants be resolved? Solutions to this problem include the appointment
65
of sub-classes in class actions, separate counsel for different classes,
guardians ad litem for different classes (especially those who may be
impaired in legal decisionmaking 6 6) and voting or plebiscite procedures for committees of claimants. Here a variety of competing values
must be resolved-should the "worst go first"67 through such devices
as pleural registries in asbestos or those oldest with needs for reproductive surgeries as occurred in the special fund in Dalkon Shield 6 8 or
should the usual rule of "first come, first served" control rationing of
potentially limited funds?69 Who should make these decisions-lawyers in settlement, legislators creating legislative or administrative
schemes, 70 judges or clerks controlling dockets or reviewing settle71
ments? Should claimants have duties toward each other?
65 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Ulab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp.), Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12521, at *50-*53 (discussing appointment of separate counsel for foreign claimants in
silicone breast implant class action on plaintiff's negotiating committee and different treatment of foreign claimants).
66
See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 1.14.
67 Schuck, supra note 44.
68 See RicHARD SOBoI, BENDING THE LAw: THE STor OF THE DAUON SHmLD BANKRuvrcy 129-35 (1991).
69 Many scholars and practitioners in the legal system assume the fairness of first to
file, first to collect. I, however, have never been persuaded that this is the fairest way to
distribute our system's limited legal goods. Can I shift the burden of persuasion to those
who still believe this is the best way to allocate limited legal resources? For an argument
that rationed legal services should be allocated on a first come, first served or "lottery"
basis, see Marshall Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor A ConceptualAnalysis, 60 N.C. L REv. 281
(1982).
70 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of A Mass Toxies Administrative
Compensation Scheme 52 MD. L. Rzv. 951 (1993).
71 If the value to be expressed here is horizontal equity, should clients have a duty to
each other? While it is beyond the scope of this Article, the question of a client's code of
ethics would be interesting to pursue. Judge Weinstein has suggested that some form of
"communitarian ethics" might be appropriate where there is some solidarity in the source
of injury. See Weinstein, supranote 53, at 46-52. Thomas Shaffer also recognizes that legal
ethics must be considered within the context of group and family memberships. See, e.g.,
THOMiAS L SHAFFER, AMERucAN LAWYERs AND THEIR COMMUNIY (1991); Shaffer, supra note
40, at 967. Claimants have already begun to act in this area by forming support groups of
various kinds. The interesting question here is how many of these groups are controlled
and managed by claimants and how many are "formed" and managed by plaintiffs' counsel. I have raised the question of whether lawyers, as well as clients, can be encouraged to
explore altruistic and empathetic responses to the plight of others. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 385 (1992). Of course, the
argument in our culture is that, unlike professionals who have agreed to be duty bound to
professional values, the courts, and each other, clients owe no duty to each other and
indeed live in a Hobbesian, Darwinian world of "survival of the fittest" and maximizing
individual gain. This may be how the world is, but it is not, in my view, an "ethical" way of
being. For illustrations of client-plaintiff support groups, see KAREN Hicxs, SURvrvING THE
DALKON SHIELD: WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1994) (describing Dalkon
Shield newsletters); Jennifer N. Carleton, Giving a Voice to the Silenced: Dalkon Shield Sumi-
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Defendants: Manufacturers, Producers, Distributors, Insurers

Those who are sued for committing "mass torts" have interests
too. Although we have long assumed defense denials and protracted
litigation, there is some evidence that at least some corporations wish
to acknowledge their wrongdoing, either for ethical or corporate responsibility reasons or instrumentally for cost reduction or public relations reasons. 72 Corporate defendants seeking to maintain their
viability need predictable and finite liability in order to insure profitability and access to capital. Defendants demonstrate an increasing
concern with capping transaction costs. This concern extends not
merely to their own costs (contained through defense cooperation
committees and use of in-house counsel) but plaintiffs' costs as well
(contained through direct negotiation of attorneys fees as part of settlement).73 Some defendants also express concern about "equitable
distributions" among competing claimants. Defendants, like plaintiffs, encounter a variety of conflicting interests. These include a
number of common insurer-insured conflicts including tensions
among efforts to cooperate on liability defense, cross-complaints on
coverage, 7 4 and other litigation with insurers.7 5 Further, defendants
may compete with each other as they seek to shift liability among
themselves and their respective insurers.7 6
vors Tell Their Stories, 9 Wis. WoMEN's LJ. 95 (1994) (describing Dalkon Shield support
groups).
72 For a comparison of corporate culture in acknowledging fault and providing redress in other cultures, see Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, CulturalAttitudes Toward
ContractLaw: Japanand the United States, 2 UCLA PAG. BASIN IJ.76 (1983); Hiroshi Wagat-

suma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United
States, 20 LAw & Soc. RFv. 461, 468 (1986) (using apologetic behavior of the president of
Japan Air Lines following the crash of a DC-8 to contrast American and Japanese legal
cultures).
73 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727-29 (1986) (noting that it is not a breach of
ethics for defense to precondition a settlement on a waiver of statutory eligibility for attorneys' fees for plaintiffs' lawyers).
74 Defendants, like plaintiffs' counsel, see Menkel-Meadow, supranote 39, suffer from
classic Prisoner's Dilemma problems in strategic decisions to cooperate or "defect," see ERic
RASMUSSEN, INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1991), both with other defendants in cooperative liability committees and with their insurers.
75 Insurers, for example, may want to collaborate with their insureds in contesting
liability and thus may want to work with defense cooperative committees. This does not
preclude them from then contesting their own liability under coverage, reckless conduct,
or other insurance defenses.
76 One adaptation to this problem has been defendant cooperation agreements assessing liability based on market share or other formulas for liability. See Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The PrivateManagement of a PublicProblem, 33 CLEv. ST. L. Rv. 375 (1984-85).
As more companies seek bankruptcy protection, more defendants attempt to shift liability
to others with court stays or other protections so they can avoid assessment of damages to
them. The first final approval of a mass tort class action settlement involved class settlement of claims against Aetna, insurer of the Robins company in the Dalkon Shield litigation. This move was welcomed by the initial defendant, because it increased the
contribution to the claimants' trust funds. See In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
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C. Plaintiffs' Counsel
In one sense the disputes in Georgine and Lindsey are simply disputes between and among different groups of plaintiffs' lawyers. Some
repeat players in these litigations want to settle their large inventory of
existing cases, particularly in the mature cases. 77 Others prefer to try
well-prepared and more lucrative cases. In Georgine, defendants
sought to effectuate a "global peace" by settling the future as well as
present claims. The defendants allegedly accomplished this by
"4choosing" which plaintiffs' counsel to negotiate with, thus drawing a
line between those repeat players who were able to negotiate the settlement and those who were left out 78 By contrast, the Lindsey settlement at least attempted to include a greater variety of claimant groups
by providing for a plaintiffs' committee comprised of openly differing
plaintiffs' lawyers.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are divided, as Professor Coffee notes, 79 by the
use of the class action device itself for mass tort settlements. Use of
this method provides an opportunity for "class action" settlement lawyers (those more familiar with the arcane requirements of the class
action device or who are more interested in fast settlements) to displace the trial lawyers who specialize in preparing and trying tort
cases. In its most stark form, this represents a competition for the
mass tort "market" between "law" lawyers and "fact" lawyers.8 0 Indeed,
so much is at stake, both in terms of the vast attorneys' fees and the
precedents set as to how these cases will be settled in the future, that
there are splits even within the "fact" and "law" groupings. 8 1
Plaintiffs' lawyers worry about how the settlement of one case will
affect another: is it wrong to settle too early, accepting smaller
1989). Defense cooperation is further complicated by attempts to equalize or use market
share as a basis for liability so as to avoid use of litigation as a competitive strike on competitors' prices. Are there antitrust implications to defense cooperation agreements if their
effect is cartel-like behavior in controlling and coordinating costs with anticompetitive effects on prices?
77 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving MatureMass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659
(1989).
78 Such counsel are not really left out; they may not like the terms of Georgine, but
they can still file their clients' claims and receive attorneys' fees through the settlement
process.
79 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 CoLUM.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
80 This division was clear in the rhetoric of argument used in motions and closings in
some of the mass tort settlement fairness hearings. Repeat play plaintiffs' lawyers are comfortable with juries, and some appear less willing or able to adapt to the arena ofjudgeheard legal argument.
81 Should we think in antitrust terms here-that some plaintiffs' attorneys will, by
virtue of their role in the settlements, have too large a "market share" of total attorneys'
fees awarded in particular mass torts? With contingent fees, there is no "claim" for the
clients of price consequences; those "hurt" are other lawyers who want a bigger piece of
the pie.
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amounts per claim while avoiding potentially dangerous proof
problems (the "Scylla" encountered in the Bendectin8 2 and Agent Orange8 3 cases), or is it better to try (the "Charybis" of risk in any trial)
the "better" cases in order to establish larger benchmark verdicts and
to use early large punitive awards to force more into the settlement
kitty? Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers are locked into obvious competition
over fees. Yet the competition goes further and extends to issues of
control over the cases and strategy (with the obvious implications for
who will extract the ultimate attorneys fees 84 ). Thus, while some ar85
gue that attorneys have a "craft" interest in how they do their work,
others, like Macey and Miller, suggest that plaintiffs' lawyers may be
locked in a battle over their "property rights" to handle (and perhaps
sell off) their cases8 6 that may pit them against each other, as well as
against their clients.8 7 Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers, like defendants and
their lawyers, are faced with a practical and classical prisoners' dilemma: whether to cooperate with other plaintiffs' lawyers in terms
of strategy and information gathering, or to adopt a course that maximizes their own share of the tort claims market or captures a greater
proportion of attorneys' fees. These dilemmas have produced "races
to the courthouse" to see who can file, try, or settle first, as well as
"races to the bottom" to see who can get earlier, quicker settlements,
or earlier trials with some punitives awarded that leave little available
cash for later players; all of these strategies result in less horizontal
equity among players (both clients and lawyers).
Such differences in approaches to cases have begun to reveal
some cracks in the usual political cooperation of the plaintiffs' bar.
While ATLA and local trial lawyers groups have successfully engaged
in law reform efforts in attempting to block mandatory arbitration8 8
82

See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).

83
See In reAgent Orange Prod. flab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); PETER
H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRAL.: MAss Toxic DiAsTmFs IN THE COURTS (1986).

84 And what the claimants will receive. Mass tort settlements develop a pattern of
higher recovery for the less injured and lower recovery for the more severely injured.
85 See Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
307 (1980); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking Informed Consent and the
Legal Profemsion, 128 U. PA. L. Rnv. 41, 126-33 (1979).
86 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comments at the Cornell Law Review Symposium (Oct. 23-24 1994).
87 The inherent conflict of interest between lawyer and client in the plaintiffs' contingency fee has long been recognized. See, e.g., Kritzer, Fee Arrangements, supra note 29, at
342-43; RosENTHAL, supra note 51, at 96-112. The conflict, however, has been largely ignored in the ethics rules, although disclosure is mandatory, and some states have imposed
capping in areas like medical malpractice. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990)
(California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act).
88 SeeJudicial Amends Act of 1994, 140 CONG. REc. S12104 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1994);
ABA meeting, House of Delegates Resolution Against Mandatory Arbitration, New Orleans
(Aug. 1994).
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or to prevent secrecy in public health and safety settlements,8 9 it is

clear that not all plaintiffs' lawyers think alike on these issues. Some
see alternative dispute resolution as a forum for faster and earlier set-

tlements, while others view it as the road to the demise of the more
lucrative contingent fee at trial. Here, splits in the plaintiffs' bar
along lines of risk aversion may demonstrate new cleavages and stratifications in the bar that affect lobbying and rule-drafting efforts on
the part of the once "unified" plaintiffs' bar.90
Both practitioners and academic commentators 91 raise concerns
that not all class actions are alike and differentiation of the plaintiffs'
bar may cause more internal conflicts. Securities cases and consumer
cases, with large numbers of plaintiffs and low economic stakes, may
present very different dynamics than high-loss bodily harm cases of
mass torts. It is not even clear how expertise in one mass tort necessar92
ily leads to expertise in another.

Yet, in other ways plaintiffs' lawyers who are seeking to settle large
numbers of torts claims through class actions present few problems
not already known to the practice of law that challenge our ethics
rules, especially conflicts of interests. Mass torts lawyers have long
been settling "inventories" of cases in which they settle for large
amounts of "fixed funds" and then allocate specific awards themselves
to individual plaintiffs.9 3 Sports lawyers representing players with
89 See TEx. R. Civ. P. 76 (a); FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (1990). See generally Arlin Thrush,
Public Health and Safety Hazards v. Confidentiality, 1994J. Disp. REsOL. 235 (preventing
secrecy in certain types of settlements and discovery proceedings). See also Carrie MenkelMeadow, PublicAccess to PrivateSettlements, 11 ALTERNATiVES 85 (June 1993).
90 It is not clear whether the plaintiffs' bar was ever more unified than any segment of
the bar. While the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA)and local and state
equivalents have always been effective lobbyists for rules affecting lawyers, there has always
been stratification of this segment of the bar, which may have recently intensified as a
result of the huge sums won by a small group of plaintiffs' lawyers. See, e.g., JEROME E.
CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); EMILY COURIC, THE TRIAL LAWYEm: THE NATION'S
Top LmGATORS TELL How THEY WIN (1988);JOHN P. HENZ & EDWARD 0. LAuiNN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SocLAL STRuCruRE OF THE BAR 232-73 (1982). One wonders how the
plaintiffs' bar would take to a uniform rate of recovery (set attorneys fees) in mass torts.
91 See Coffee, Summary, supra note 29; Resnik, "Cases"to "Litigation," supranote 43, at
6-16.
92 Entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers now call themselves "specialists in women's
health claims" and have moved from Dalkon Shield to breast implants, even though the
medicine involved in these cases is totally different. Further, asbestos lawyers are moving,
perhaps with slightly greater claims to expertise, to tobacco cases, claiming the disease
processes are quite similar (even if the warning and liability issues may be somewhat different). See Weinstein, supra note 53, at 18. See Broin v. Phillip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888,
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversal of dismissal of class action suit on behalf of class of
nonsmokers claiming injuries from inhalation of second-hand smoke).
93 Without client consent, this is a violation of MODEL' RuLES, supra note 20, Rule
1. 8 (g). One wonders how often this "violation" is monitored, either by courts, disciplinary
bodies, or in malpractice actions. Is such "bundling" of individual settlements any better
than the claimed violations of individual rights in the future claimant settlements?
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team salary caps are in a sense advocating for concurrent clients with
possible fixed fund conflicts. Entertainment lawyers representing
writers and producers who are seeking limited air time from network
decisionmakers also represent concurrent clients with a conflicting interest in seeking "limited fund" allocations. 94 Criminal lawyers who
either subtly or more overtly plea bargain for multiple defendants (or
who signal differences in repeat play negotiations with prosecutors9 5)
are also engaged in "conflicting" representation of concurrent clients,
often without the kind of overt and informed consent contemplated
by the rules. So, contend the mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers, concurrent
'96
representation is "common practice.
D.

Defense Counsel

Like their clients, diverse defendants and insurers, and like their
often detested opponents, the plaintiffs' lawyers, defense counsel also
face prisoners' dilemmas with each other and conflicts with their clients. Decisions to cooperate and share information have led to group
defenses designed to minimize defendants' total liability, but a single
defection can prove costly to those who remain. 9 7 Like their brothers
and sisters who have conflicts over contingent fees, hourly fee lawyers
also have conflicts with clients over lavish hourly billing that can almost equal the huge verdicts plaintiffs' lawyers trade on. 98
Defense counsel also may have an interest in seeking predictability in the handling of such cases. Managing litigation is one of the
services offered to large corporate clients, and with increasing competition for legal services the ability to guarantee results and cap liability
certainly militates in favor of seeking the finality of some forms of class
action settlements. Giant defendants, notorious for their preference
94 In California, the common practices of entertainment lawyers representing concurrent clients competing over limited resources, or worse yet, representation of "all sides of
the deal" have led to a spate of new litigation challenging some of the leading entertainment lawyers. See Citron & Welkos, supranote 40 at D1; Richard Leary, The Rules Against
Conflict of Interest: Can Hollywood Honor Them? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
95 See, e.g., MILTON HEUMAN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE ExPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES AND DEFENSE LAwYERs (1978); LYNN MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRLA.
THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL CASE DISPOSITION (1979); PAMELA Urz, SErrLNG THE FACTS: DIS
ION

(1978).
96 This position is supported by the expert testimony of Professor Geoffrey Hazard,
though it does not necessarily include these same examples. See Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing Professor Hazard's testimony).
97 In this sense bankruptcy is one form of defection that leaves more solvent defendants "holding the bag."
98
Defense counsel are more likely to have their fees policed by clients these days,
both in the new approaches to billing by insurers and larger corporations, and by in-house
counsel who put pressure on firms to monitor billing practices and create fee incentives for
AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT

settlement. See Stephen Saop & Robert Litan, Reforming the Lauyer-Client Relationship
Through Alternative BillingMethods, 77 JUDICATURE 191 (1994).
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for delay and the resulting putting off of liability, recently shifted the
traditional assumptions of litigation with their efforts to quickly settle
and determine total liability. The end result is that defendants, who
need to cabin their liability exposure, may seek to settle claims faster
(and cheaper) than plaintiffs' lawyers, who may need to develop the
case law or worry about low settlement values as precedents.
Like their ideologically committed brothers and sisters in the
plaintiffs' bar, many defense counsel believe they are performing an
important social and public function; here, the conservation of corporate resources for more productive uses. 99 Lawyers thus attempt to
morally "justify" settlements from both sides of the litigation tables.
Yet these defense counsel must be careful about how they choose
their settling partners. If any of the charges of "collusion" in these
cases are sustained, defendants may find that the class action process
that they have so recently come to embrace will be foreclosed.
E. The Courts and Judges
Perhaps most concerned about the ambiguity of rules and principles for settling mass torts are the judges who are asked to approve
these settlements under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(e).
It is they who must interpret the rules and decide whether counsel are
adequate, current ethics rules are violated, and if settlements are fair.
Judges deciding these issues in the current seas of ambiguity must first
face their own existential crises of role. They must decide whether to
take an activist role such as Judges Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y), Robert R. Merhige (E.D. Va.), S. Arthur Spiegel (N.D. Ohio), Charles Weiner (E.D. Pa.), Samuel C. Pointer (D. Alabama), Robert Parker (E.D.
Texas), Thomas Lambros (N.D. Ohio), Richard Ensalen (W.D.
Mich.), and others who actively engage in the settlement or case management process, or whether to remain more passive and disinterested from the settlement. The Code ofJudicial Conduct provides little
guidance, and few standards in the rules or cases set limits on when a
judge should refrain from examining the fairness of a settlement he
has helped broker. 10 0 As some have argued recently, judges may also
be interested parties in these proceedings, seeking their "self-interest,"1 1 either in fame or personal and social satisfaction from han99 This is a rationale I have heard from asbestos defense lawyers, particularly those
working on property damage and asbestos removal cases, where the effectiveness of asbestos removal (measured against its cost) is not entirely clear. Interview with Stephen Madva,
Esq., counsel for defense of national class action school cases, in Philadelphia, Pa. (July
1990) ("Shouldn't money be preserved for educational purposes if it is not clear that asbestos is 'friable' [dislodged in the air] in the schools?").
100 See Day v. NLO, 864 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Spiegel, supra note 45.
101 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Macey, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994);Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice
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dling big "public" cases, or efficiency by settling masses of "tedious"
cases.
Moreover, judges must decide such difficult questions as when
and how to invoke the ethical rules as standards for the "adequacy of
counsel" under the class action rules;1 02 how deeply to inquire into
such questions as whether counsel really are adequate in the substantive as well as procedural or ethical sense; how much the conduct of
lawyers should be scrutinized in assessing the fairness of the deal; and
how much the court can, should, or must evaluate the substantive fairness of the negotiated deal. Ironically, critics assail judges for displacing the legislature by approving class action settlements that look very
much like legislative or administrative schemes, although Congress itself essentially forced the courts to focus on increasing the use of settlement as a method of case management. 0 3 Judges have faced the
important social, political, and practical issues of how to deal with
such massive numbers of claimants equitably, while others, including
Congress, have refused to act.'0 4 Thus, some judges confronted the
and the Rules of Procedure,23J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994); see alsoCoffee, Summary, supra note
29, at 857.
102 Judge Reed in Georgineand most federal courts see ethical standards in the federal
courts as an issue of the federal courts' authority to manage themselves. See Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger 2
F.3d 1304, 1316 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[E]thical standards imposed on attorneys in federal
courts are a matter of federal law."). The ethics rules that are applied, however, are state
rules. Thus, Erie problems may exist, not just with the displacement of state substantive
torts standards in federal class action settlements, but with the interpretation by federal
courts of state ethics rules. See Richard Marcus, They Can'tDo That, Can They? TortReform
Via Rule 23, 80 Cop'Eu. L. REv. 858 (1995); see also Linda Mullenix, Multiforum Federal
Practice: Ethics and Erie, GEo.J. LEG. ETHics (forthcoming 1995). This is no small matter.
In California, if there is a conflict of concurrent clients' interests, clients must consent in
writingto continue the joint representation. CAL. RULES OF PRoFSSIoNAL CoNDucr Rule 3310(C) (Supp. 1995). Would this mean that in a mass tort class action settlement in California that written consent would have to be obtained from every class member? If a federal court in California holds otherwise, as a matter of federal law, what does that tell us
about a federal common law of ethics? The Ninth Circuit has held that in California federal courts, the California rules apply. See Golden Eagle Dist. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing sanctions, under FaD. R. Crv. P. 11, against law
firm that did not reveal adverse authority to the federal district court, as required by the
ABA MODEL Rurxs, supranote 20, Rule 3.3 (a) (3), but not by the California Rules or under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the majority); see also Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176-77 (1986) (Brennan, J. concurring) (suggesting that lawyers' ethics rules are state rules that should not be federalized or "constitutionalized," even
in Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). There may also be choice
of law issues in determining which state's ethics rules should apply with legal activities
occurring in a variety of states. See Mullenix, supra.
103
See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993). For critiques that
Congress usurped the courts' powers to control their own functioning, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice,77 MJNN. L. REv.375 (1992).
104 For fuller details and explanations for why Congress has not acted, using public
choice and other theories, see, for example, Coffee, Summary, supranote 29; Schuck, supra
note 21; Siliciano, supra note 2.
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question of whether to exercise power in a legislative vacuum. These
105
decisions touch on important separation of powers issues.
F. Other Third Party Neutrals
In the context of deciding these questions, courts have increasingly looked to a new breed of "third party neutrals" or court adjuncts,
raising important issues about the standards or rules of ethics to be
applied to these actors. 106 Are special masters, court-appointed
mediators, and others who assist the parties in negotiation or the
judge in evaluating the formulas set for settlement, to be judged by
the Judicial Code of Conduct or by other rules, such as the lawyers'
Model Rules of Professional Conduct? 07 Such third parties often
meet with the parties privately, learn confidential and proprietary information, often suggest settlement frameworks themselves, 108 and
may have conflicts of interests of their own, based on past advocacy
work or prior third party neutral roles. How much such third parties
share with the judges they work for may also affect how "neutral" the
judge is when called upon to judge the fairness of the settlement.10 9
As in Agent Orange,110 when some disgruntled parties later challenged
the role of third party neutrals who expressed the "views" of Judge
Weinstein in settling the case,"' challenges to the activities of third
party neutrals may occur when the settlement is consummated or has
"gone bad" with one of the parties. All of these issues may be further
105 These decisions implicate political issues as well. If Congress has been unable to act
because of the gridlock caused by the balance of powerful corporate interests and the
organized plaintiffs' bar, then what should the courts do as a nondemocratic, but accountable, institution? As others have suggested, an institutional and political balance may have
been struck by the courts acting and Congress' failure to correct or change what the courts
have done. See Schuck, supra note 21.
106 See, e.g., ThirdParty Neutrals, supranote 45; Ex Parte Talks, supranote 45; see also In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Judge
Weinstein's decision on Special Master Kenneth Feinberg's conflicts of interest holding
that standards ofJudicial Code of Conduct apply).
107 A group comprised of the American Bar Association (ABA), American Arbitration
Association (AAA), and Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) have
drafted an ethics code for mediators, to be considered at this year's ABA annual meeting,
but some are troubled by the proposed rules' failure to deal with some of these new courtadjunct roles and the roles that institutions (courts and private providers) play in assigning
and assessing third party neutrals. The Commission on Ethics and Standards in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, formed by the Center for Public Resources in New York, will consider
these issues. Annual Center for Public Resources Meeting, New York (Jan. 25, 1995).
108 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, CreatingAlternativesforAsbestos Claims, 45 ARB.J. 3 (1990);
Francis E. McGovern, Toward A FunctionalApproach for Managing Complex Litigation,53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 440 (1986).
109 It wasJudge Charles Weiner's prior relationship with the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), the defendant in Georgine, that caused him to refer the fairness hearing to
Judge Reed. See Spiegel, supranote 45, at 1565.
110 See sources cited supra note 83.
111
See SCHUCK, supra note 83, at 155-67 (1986).
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complicated when cases are referred out "for settlement purposes" to
private third party neutrals who may or may not be working with full
2
authority of the court."
G.

Legislatures-Administrative Agencies

Standing by, as we debate the role of parties, attorneys, and
courts in the settlement of mass tort class actions, are those bodies
that might be better suited to solving the compensatory and other policy aspects of "resolving" the mass tort "crisis." While I will not review
the debate here about whether an administrative structure might not
be better suited to determining compensation, 1 3 it is clear that the
legislatures (both federal and state) and possible administrative agencies (why not a Federal Emergency Management Agency for mass
torts?) are interested parties in these issues. If the current group of
mass tort class action settlements prove successful (i.e., are sustained
on appeal and prove to be efficient devices for settlement), then the
legislatures are likely to prefer the status quo. If, on the other hand,
interest groups are dissatisfied with the administration and fairness of
settlements achieved through litigation and settlement, there may be
increased demand for legislative and administrative action. Though
beyond the scope of the present Article, it is useful, in assessing what
an appropriate settlement process is in these cases, to consider
whether legislative and administrative (such as reg-neg" 4) processes
with inputs ex ante from interest groups might produce better "settlement" processes (that is, more participatory), as well as results, (depending on how "captured" the respective groups are by interested
parties).
We should also consider the reasons for legislative failure-interest group politics, campaign financing,"15 and other modern determinants of political failure. Is it appropriate or desirable for the courts
to act in these arenas of important public policy when the legislative
bodies are stalemated by powerful interests? What ought the relations
112 Whether third party neutrals working in the private sector but referred by the court
will have both the authority and "protections" of court rules, judicial immunity, or standards for work is an important unresolved issue. For cases holding that court-appointed
third party neutrals do serve under judicial standards, see Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995) (holding mediator was protected by
quasi-judicial immunity); Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (2d Dist. 1990) (holding
court appointed psychologist to judicial immunity standard).
113 See Rabin, supra note 70, at 964; Brickman supra note 64, at 1821.
114 See PhilipJ. Harter, NegotiatingRegulations:A CureForMalaise71 GEo. LJ. 1 (1982);
Stephen Goldberg, Reflections on Negotiated Rule-Making, WAsH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42.
115 See, e.g., Tommy's List, WALL ST.J., Nov. 8, 1994, atA22 (editorial reporting on con-

tributions of lawyers, specifically the ATLA, to congressional political campaigns). Of
course an editorial from the other end of the political spectrum could have examined the
role of insurance companies in similar financing campaigns.

SETTLEMENTS OF MASS TORTS

19951

1187

of one institution be to another? How do state regulatory bodies, like
lawyer disciplinary bodies, relate to other institutions like the
116
courts?
H.

The Public or Polity

While the average citizen may not be concerned with the more
arcane aspects of negotiation and conflict of interest ethics, it is clear
that the public should have an interest in the larger issues implicated
here-to whom should we trust the allocation of scarce resources,
both money for injuries suffered and time and facilities for our public
institutions? The public ought to also have an interest in how ethics
rules are made and enforced. Ethics rules may influence the esteem
with which lawyers are held by their potential clients, and whether the
profession can adequately police itself clearly has implications for the
legitimacy of its use by people who need lawyers. Even for those who
are not currently "injured" in a mass tort, the likelihood that some
family member or friend might someday be injured gives most members of the public a stake in how these issues are decided. 117 Finally,
the treatment of these cases in the legal system, as covered by the media, affects the public's sense of accessibility to and legitimacy of the
legal system. The resolution of mass torts implicates important financial issues as well, not just the use and financing of the legal system,
but the "public" costs of increased prices for hazardous goods, drugs,
and other substances as the costs of damage awards are passed on to
the consumer.
Thus, we all have a stake in how these questions of the fairness of
mass torts settlements are decided. How, then should they be
decided?
III
THE PROBLEMS: ANALYSIS OF THE E~mics ISSUES IN MASS
TORT CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

At the core of the problems in analyzing the ethics issues in the
settlement of mass torts through class action is the assumption made
116 For example, if appeals on the conflicts of interests issues fail in the federal courts,
could disgruntled class members file disciplinary charges? Professor Koniak has already
suggested that class members might have malpractice actions against class counsel for conflicts of interests or for the quality of the settlements achieved. Koniak, supra note 27, at
1141, 1145-47.

117 Some think that it is precisely because injury by a product or in an accident is so
remote to most people that mass tort victims have been unable to successfully organize for
political and statutory relief. If the new rash of tobacco cases is successful, classes defined
to include anyone who has ever smoked a cigarette may be a large and concrete enough
incentive to facilitate such political organizing.
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by the ethics rules of individual attorney-client representation'" 8 and
what the content of such a relationship should be. Mass torts, by definition, affect groups of people, and all attorneys representing masses
or groups of clients are likely to have conflicts of interests. 119 At another level, although the Kutak Commission's redraft of the Code of
Professional Responsibility did begin to draft rules for lawyers in different roles 120 and to acknowledge some of the differences in the
types or areas of practice, 12 ' the Model Rules still represent an ethics
for lawyers who are presumed to be engaged in a generic practice,
with a focus on litigation-even transactional problems are analyzed
122
with an assumption of the adversary model.
Thus, the application of the current ethics rules do present some
issues for lawyers and courts who would seek to use the class action to
settle masses of cases outside of more conventional representation relationships. The existing rules, though they can be "adapted" to meet
these problems (see suggestions for solutions below in Part V), do not
really contemplate either the kind of lawyer-client relations that exist
in the settlement of mass torts or the kinds of tasks and activities engaged in by the legal actors in these situations. Thus, at issue is the
transsubstantive claims of the rules, and the recognition, from applications to unusual cases, that the rules do not provide adequate guidance either in unusual cases or even in the presumed "typical"
representation situation.
These cases also present difficult questions of authority and
power. Given the difficulty in applying the ambiguous rules, 2 3 who
will be responsible for definitive judgments about the standards by
which we measure lawyer conduct and settlement outcomes-federal
judges?124 state disciplinary boards? ethics committees of various level
118
There is some recognition in the rules that some attorneys represent entities, organizations, or the government, see, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supranote 20, Rule 1.13, but even this
rule doesn't deal with some forms of group representation such as unions. Further, there
is no explicit ethics rule that deals with the ethical issues in class action representation
(which has been dealt with under the rubric of class action decisional law).
119 See infra part IIIAL.
120
See, e.g., Lawyer as Advisor, MODEL RuLES, supra note 20, Rule 2.1; Lawyer as Prosecutor, id. Rule 3.8.
121
The Model Rules allow lawyers for indigents to pay costs of litigation but prohibit
estate lawyers from receiving a bequest in wills drafted. See id. Rules 1.8(c) & (e) (2).
122
See id. Rule 2.2 (describing the lawyer as intermediary between two represented
parties, giving no guidance for the lawyer who acts as a mediator between parties who are
not "represented" in a conventional adversary sense).
123
I refer here not only to the ambiguity or different interpretations of the ethics rules
as evidenced by the disputes among the expert witnesses in these cases, but also to the
relationship of the ethics rules to the fairness determinations under FED. R. CrV. P. 23(e).
124
See Stephen B. Burbank, StateEthical Codes and FederalPractice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions fororm 19 FOPDHAM URB. LJ. 969 (1992).
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bar associations? the American Law Institute (ALl)? 25 state judges?
lawyers and experts 26 who craft arguments and opinions? parties who
may or may not accede to both the representational relationships they
27
are in or to the specific outcomes of settlements?
A.

The Rules
1.

Conflicts of Interests

The application of conflicts of interests rules in mass torts class
action settlements reveal a series of problems of interpretation or policy unanswerable by the current rules:
1) How can groups of people, with potentially differing interests,
be represented by a single lawyer?
2) How can members of a class "consent" to potentially conflicting representation? How can they evaluate whether their lawyers have
a "reasonable" belief that there will be no material adverse impact on
their representation?
3) How do the underlying values of loyalty and confidentiality
find expression in group representation?
4) Is class action representation really so different from other
forms of multiple party representation that lead inevitably to conflicts
of interests? If such representation and conflicts are so common, do
28
our current rules reflect or effectively police actual practice?
5) Should conflicts of interests rules be used to express other
legal profession values? (Is the public better served with wider dispersion of legal services to a greater number of lawyers for increased competition, and "lower prices," but perhaps with lower levels of
29
expertise? )
125

In its present draft the RESTATEMFNT (DRafr)

OF THE LAW or IAwYEPrNC does not

provide much guidance on ethical issues implicated in the handling of mass torts. See
Mullenix, supranote 3; Weinstein, supra note 21. Would it be possible for the ALI groups
on Complex Litigation, Products Liability, and the Law of Lawyering to compose a joint
group to deal with such issues? (Is there not yet enough law to "restate" the standards?)
126 Although judges are using experts on the ethical issues in mass tort class action
settlements they don't need to. The ethics rules are "law" which could appropriately be
interpreted by judges, as any law.
127 How should all of those with interests canvassed in Part IIof this Article be involved
in the decisionmaking process required here?
128
For a recent argument that corporate lawyer "conflicts" within the entity being represented have long been tolerated while other "collective" conflicts have not, see William
Simon, The Dark Secret ofProgressiveLawyers: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarshipin the PostModern, Post-ReaganEra, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 401 (1995).
129
This question, of course, raises an interesting empirical question. Does the concentration of lawyers in a given sub-specialty really lead to efficiencies or benefits of expertise?
How difficult is it for a new lawyer to "master" the liability rules, facts, medical, and insurance issues at stake in particular mass torts?
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6) Can lawyers perform more than one function in a single case
(negotiating settlements, representing and advocating for particular
claims, and monitoring the settlement funds)?130
In considering whether class counsel (settling future claimants'
claims against specific defendants, as in both Georgine and Lindsey)
have inappropriate conflicts of interest (since class counsel represent
different possible groupings of future claimants, as well as present "clients" 31 ) we look to Rule 1.7(b) and 1.8(g) of the Model Rules.
Although Professor Hazard testified, in Georgine,'3 2 that there was no
violation (indeed no application) of Rule 1.7 since the future claimants (members of the class) were not clients of class counsel, other
experts, notably Professors Cramton and Koniak, testified that there
was a conflict, specifically because future claimants did not receive the
"same deal" as present clients received in the settlement of the asbestos inventories of the class counsel. In Professor Hazard's view,
(adopted by the court in Georgine), although there was no formal client relationship, class counsel owed the class members a similar duty
of loyalty and diligence, derived from the fiduciary obligations of class
action lawyers.
A strict reading of Rule 1.7(b) indicates that if clients (or third
persons 33) have interests that would be "materially limiting" on the
representation, the lawyer must 1) determine (based on his reason130 I have not focused here on the more obvious conflicts of interests that arise when
lawyers serve the multiple roles, as in the Georgine settlement, of monitoring and auditing
the settlement and claims processing, since Judge Reed himself recognized that issue and
offered the remedy of expanding the monitoring team. A more open and participatory
auditing committee of plaintiffs' lawyers (as in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 1, 1994)) may be one practical solution that doesn't really eliminate the conflict
of interest, it just distributes it more broadly and attempts to assure a better monitoring
process. The existence of this kind of fiduciary and representational conflict reveals other
lapses in our rules. Except for such rules as MODEL RULEs, supranote 20, Rule 2.2 (dealing
with intermediary representation of two or more parties in the same transaction), the rules
do not deal with a variety of nonrepresentational roles that lawyers play that could interfere with representational roles (e.g., audit functions, serving as a receiver or master,
mediators and other third party neutrals, serving on the board of directors, or simultaneously being a member and representative of an organization).
131 Like Professor Koniak, I have adopted the nomenclature of present clients and
future claimants. The use of these words does seem to put the rabbits in the hats-future
claimants are pretty close to "future" clients, which could implicate not only the rules pertaining to concurrent clients, MODEL Rutis, supra note 20, Rule 1.7, but successive clients,
id. Rule 1.9, if present and future clients are seen as having "materially adverse interests" in
competing for the same funds.
132 See Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 30-67, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No.
93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (testimony of Geoffrey Hazard) [hereinafter Fairness
Hearing].
133 Thus, for me, whether the future claimants are clients or not does not matter since
the potentially materially adverse interests of any "third parties" to existing clients raises
issues under MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 1.7.
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able belief) that such representation will not be adversely affected and
2) obtain the client's consent after consultation. Most of the attention
in the cases has been paid to the first prong, through a "back-end"
analysis of whether the settlement is "fair" to both "sets" of claimants,
as "evidence" that the class lawyers could not have had a "reasonable
belief" that their various "relationships" to parties were "materially
limiting" each other. Settling lawyers claim that since the negotiated
bargain was fair (as between plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants for the
future claimants) there was no adverse impact on these potential future claimants. The court, in treating the claim that future claimants
were treated differently in the settlement than those who have already
filed their claims (most specifically in the provision of settlements and
no immediate damages for those with pleural thickening), found that
there are rational reasons for the differences in treatment. The Georgine court concludes that current litigants have already born the expense and other costs of litigating, and future claimants can be paid
34
settlement amounts based on lower transaction costs.'
While there clearly are rational "differences" between these two
classes of claimants, it is hard to see how different costs and experiences of the legal system would be a rational basis for treating pleural
claimants differently in the settlement than in litigation, since nonpleural clients in the current inventories also experienced these differences. This is clearly a difference in "legal" treatment as claimed by
many of the critics-the settlement alters state law (in some states) by
creating different benefits for pleural claimants than they would receive by litigating (in some states' 3 5 ). The class groupings are not
134 As an illustration of how these issues became conflated in the decision, consider
that the court treats the comparison of the inventory clients with the settlement claimants
as an issue pertaining to fraud or collusion (based on Professor Coffee's argument that the
settling counsel "colluded" to give future claimants less than what was extracted for present
clients), rather than as an issue of whether one "representation" materially affected the
other "representation." Perhaps most troubling to me is the court's "finding" that the class
action settlement was not entered into "for the purpose of settling [the] pending cases."
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RD. 246, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This seems contrary to testimony on all sides of the case. That there were still contingencies in the finality
of the class settlement when the present inventories were settled is clear, but it also seems
most likely that the present client inventory settlements were made because the "global
peace" sought by the defendants was at hand.
135 Compare Busfield v. A.C. & S., Inc., 434 Pa. Super. 424 (1994) (holding that with
pleural thickening, an "asymptomatic" asbestos disease, plaintiff could not recover for fear
of cancer) with Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 417 Pa. Super. 440 (1992) (holding that claimant can bring action at discovery of thickening of the lungs). See also Volterano v. Works
Comp. Bd., 639 A.2d 453 (1994) (holding that pleural thickening is not an "occupational
disease" for recovery purposes under Worker's Compensation scheme); Giffear v. JohnsMansville Corp., 632 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (en banc) (holding that "without
physical symptoms, impairment or disability, pleural thickening is a noncompensable injury and therefore, does not give rise to a cause of action" and explicitly overruling cases
allowing a cause of action for pleural thickening such as Morrison v. Fibreboard Corp., 630
A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
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necessarily related to differential experiences (and costs) of the legal
system, but rather do represent the groupings made by lawyers settling
136
different classes of cases.
The ethics experts and courts seem to have analyzed the problem
this way, looking at the actual settlement as a reflection of the adequacy of the representation in order to avoid the complex problem of
client consent. By doing so they define away the conflicts issue and
treat it somewhat differently than if the two or more groups of clients
and claimants were recognized as having different, and possibly adverse, interests. The court adopts Professor Hazard's views that there
is no conflict because the lawyers have satisfied their fiduciary duties
to the class (in negotiating adequately and getting a good deal) and
rejects the objectors' claim there is a conflict and that counsel failed
to obtain adequate consent. The analytic question here is whether
class counsel can reasonably conclude that there is no materially adverse interest among groups of clients and claimants because they
(counsel) are so good and able that they can negotiate effectively for
all. 137 In my view, a conflict (or the potential for it) exists, and thus I

tan to the question of whether it is so material or so adverse that it
cannot be consented to (a "nonconsentable" conflict).138 As Judge
Reed found in Georgine, enough adversity existed between plaintiffs
and defendant, and negotiations were sufficiently "long [and] deliberative" to support the conclusion that counsel were adequate representatives of the different groups. 39 This invokes a "process" view of
the representation. This view holds that by themselves, long and hard
136

See Koniak, supra note 27, at 1059-64.

137

For a discussion of the applicability of subjective and objective tests for this stan-

dard, see CHAR.S W. WOLFA.M, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 341-42, 352-58 (1986) (reviewing

law as of 1985 and suggesting that "non-litigation" conflicts are more likely to be tolerated). Should the future claimant class conflicts issue be measured by a litigation or transactional standard?
The current situation raises the question of whether representation outside of a formal litigation context in court (i.e., in negotiation) should be measured differently depending on the task performed by the lawyer. Note that one could easily apply the
"obvious" standard of the Model Code in this situation because the negotiation is in the
context of adverse litigation for the present claimants, and there is no litigation pending
for future claimants. The lawyers are merely engaging in a negotiated "transaction" in
which they believe that they can adequately represent a variety of parties. Thus, the question arises as to how the lawyers' reasonable belief should be measured-by looking inside
the on-going negotiation (process) or by evaluating the negotiated deal (substantive
review).
138 This is a question about which courts and experts have differed because of the
values of allowing clients the opportunity to "choose" their lawyers versus competing interests of the appearance of impropriety for the profession and courts and a "paternalistic"
concern that clients will not be able to take care of themselves in this arena.
139 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Judge
Pointer reached a similar conclusion in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., Nos. GV92-P-10000-S, GV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala.
Apr. 1, 1994). In that case there were different groups of plaintiffs' lawyers negotiating for
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negotiations support the conclusion that plaintiffs' lawyers bargained
hard (and well?) for their various groups of clients. Much like judges
who are hesitant to grant disqualification motions because of the cost
to the system and clients' choice of counsel, 140 the courts in these
cases pursue practical interests when they fail to pursue the conflicts
issues. The consent issue in class action settlements is hard to resolve
under current ethics and class action rules. In my view, if the courts
accept the finding that there is a potential conflict (and I believe
there is) then, if it is not a disqualifying nonconsentable conflict, the

41
clients (and the claimants) must consent.1
Thus, the difficult question unavoidably arises of what constitutes
consent in mass class action settlements. There are several possible
approaches. First, in the class action context, the court can consider
itself the "consenting" party-in essence, ruling from the basis of the
fairness hearing that the parties either have constructively consented
142
or would consent to such a "fair" deal and the work of class counsel.
Second, the notice of the class action settlement could provide a description of the potential conflicts' 4 3 along with an individual client
waiver form. Consent can be presumed from silence,'4 while the ex-

different interests, but not for all of them. Counsel for foreign claimants objected that the
interests of their clients were not adequately met.
140
See GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING 627 (2d ed. 1993).
141
For a related argument that consent decree settlements that affect third parties
(even in injunctive relief) should require consent of the affected party, see Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties,1987 U. CH.
LEG;AL F. 103; Douglas Laycock, Due Processof Law in TrilateralDisputes,78 IOWAL. REv. 1011
(1992-93) (suggesting that class representatives and the procedural protections of the class
action device could be enough for "consent" to a settlement). Thus, I am only extending
this analysis of class consent to a settlement to class consent to a conflict of interest. This
would require information about the potential (and actual) conflicts to appear in the notices of class action settlement, advising parties of their rights to opt out. No such language
appeared in the Georgine notices.
142 The difficulty with this is that the ethical rules contemplate consent prior to representational acts, not after the work has been "completed." Consent given at the beginning
of a representation can turn out to be inadequate if new circumstances develop that increase the "adversity" of the interests or render the conflicts more "real."
143
The colloquy at the symposium between Professor McGovern (explaining the content of the Lindsey settlement) and Professor Henderson made clear that explications of
the substantive terms of class action settlements are difficult enough even in person. James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Francis E. McGovern, Comments at the CornellLaw Review Symposium
(Oct. 24, 1994). Such notices become even more complex when potential conflicts and
requests for waivers are added to written class action notices. This raises the difficult issue
of how much counseling is required for an adequate waiver of conflicts. Do clients understand better from oral and interactive counseling sessions with lawyers than through
printed notices? Or would modern technology, such as videos and computer programs or
telephone hotlines that explain legal notices and offer interactive questioning opportunities, be more effective?
144 This would require a change of law in some states, such as California, which require
consents to conflicts of interests to be in writing. See Cu- RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 3-310(C) (Supp. 1995).
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tent and depth of consent can be measured from the number of "optouts." 14 5 Third, a class representative for each group (comprised of

actual clients or potential claimants) could be considered "the client"
for purposes of ascertaining consent. Also, as has happened in some
cases, the court could appoint a guardian ad litem to assess the "fairness" of the settlement or to "consent" for the differing classes of
claimants. 14 Unfortunately, none of these solutions to the consent
problem are "authorized" by the ethics rules, which seem to require
individual consent and assume a single attorney-client relationship.
Efforts to justify some of these alternative modes of notice or consent
have not yet passed appellate muster.
In addition to the difficult consent issues in the class action context, there is also Professor Hazard's persuasive testimony that these
kinds of "conflicts" are quite common in multiple client contexts.
How then can one square the language of the rules with the reality of
law practice? 147 The testimony in Georgine refers to classic multiple
party situations, such as whole families involved in car accidents suing
148
the same defendant, but having slightly to very different interests.
Other examples in the law abound: husband and wife or sibling
wills; 1 49 sports or entertainment lawyers representing several clients

against contracting parties with limited or fixed resources; criminal
lawyers with "repeat play" relations who trade one case off against another. These constitute conflicts of interests as well and may present
more direct harm, given the presumed loyalty of the individual lawyerclient relationship. We know that the rules require consent in such
cases, and we know that consent is not always obtained.' 50 Thus, the
conflicts*of interests rules may be presenting some of the same
problems that led Professor White to conclude, many years ago, that
negotiation behavior could not be regulated by ethics rules. 151 Wide145 This is in essence what is being described in the aftermath of these two major settlements. If too many people opt out, we will know either that they think the settlement is
substantively unfair, or that the potential claimants would prefer a chance to litigate or
settle with their own lawyers, outside of the specified processes developed by the settlement. See David R. Olmos & Henry Weinstein, Breast Implant Settlement In Peril,LA. TIMES,
May 5, 1995, at 1.
146 SeeAhearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1993) (appointment
of Professor Eric Green as Special Master to assess fairness of settlement); Report of Guardian Ad Litem, Eric D. Green, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:9-526 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
1995).

147 See MODEL RULES, supra note 20, Rule 1.8(g) (requirement that in cases of aggregate settlements of cases with multiple clients, each client must consent).
148 See Fairness Hearing, supra note 132, at 3-38 (Feb. 24, 1995).
149 See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 967.
150

See articles cited supranote 94, referring to entertainment cases in which absence of

consent in conflict situations has become an issue. In California, consent in the MODEL
RULES, supra note 20, Rule 1.7(b) situation requires written consent. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CoNDucr Rule 3-310(C) (Supp. 1995).
151 See White, supra note 35, at 926-27.
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spread ignorance or disobedience of these rules might lead to disparagement and loss of legitimacy of all of the rules. That the
requirement of consent is overlooked in a wide variety of cases is no
justification that consent should be ignored or "waived" in the context
of mass torts. Conflicts rules should be enforced where they are
clear-the question is what happens if the rules don't seem to contemplate a particular situation? Are conflicts in mass tort class actions
different from conflicts in other areas?
The difficulty of analyzing and then enforcing the conflicts rules
in the mass tort class action settlement context merely reveals the difficulties with conflicts issues more generally. 152 Several groups of lawyers who commonly work with groups or limited sets of clients, such as
entertainment lawyers, 153 suggest that the current conflicts rules don't
54
reflect the reality of their practices.
These conflicts between classes or other "groupings" of individual
clients (such as present clients and future potential claimants)1 55 may
well be different from conflicts involving concurrent individual clients. A discussion of how both the conflicts rules and the class action
rules may need to be redrafted to reflect these differences may be in
order. We should at least openly debate the differences and issues implicated here, rather than simply assimilate different situations to
rules that were clearly not drafted with these varieties of lawyer-client15 6
claimant arrangements in mind.
152 And ifjudges and scholars are having problems with them, practitioners are having
greater difficulties. As a teacher of "pervasive ethics" at UCLA, I questioned a large number
of lawyers in Los Angeles about what their greatest (in number and in difficulty to resolve)
ethics problems were. For most practitioners, regardless of field of practice, the most
troubling issue was that of conflicts of interests. Practitioners regard these rules as restraints on trade without adequate justification. They feel quite capable of switching sides
or clients without offending the underlying principles of loyalty or confidentiality. In many
practitioners' eyes it is clients who are jumping ship and moving from law firm to law firm
and so law firms need to be able to represent all comers, regardless of prior relationships
as long as confidences are protected and actual current conflicts are monitored. This is
what has led to the use of "screens" in private practice, even when the rules authorize them
only in cases involving movement from government to private practice. CompareTrone v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980) with LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Lake County, 703 F.2d 252
(7th Cir. 1983).
153 See articles cited supranote 94.
154 I think they do and should be enforced. See discussion supra notes 40, 94, infra
note 165.
155
Could MODEL RuLES, supranote 20, Rule 1.8(g) be redrafted to consider separate
rules for class action settlements that would still require some ex ante consent under Rule
1.7(b) before the negotiation starts and another "consent" once the negotiated agreement
has been consummated? See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 783.
156
The rules and comments do refer to the relationship between counsel and client as
possibly being affected by potential or actual conflicts. The rules convey an image of a
relationship between an individual client and lawyer, and fail to consider the relationship
of a class lawyer to a class member who may be a potential claimant, future client, or no
client at all.
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From the client's perspective, the underlying interests sought to
be protected by conflicts of interests rules are confidentiality and loyalty. In the settlement of mass torts, the claim is that loyalty is compromised when classes of individual cases are traded off against each
other. This claim implicates the ethics rules requiring "zealous" representation 5 7 and assumptions that loyal and zealous representation
require individual maximization 158 (usually of monetary claims). 159
Thus, the conflicts of interests are measured by the "quality of the
deal," and loyalty is presumed to be compromised if differential treatment between the classes can be shown. 16 0 Yet, how can loyalty to
groups or classes of claimants be demonstrated? Even if inventory settlements of present claims were loyally and diligently negotiated, it is a
common practice for plaintiffs and defendants to agree to global sums
to be divided by plaintiffs' attorneys, so the notion of individually negotiated settlements may largely be a myth. If the concern with the
future class settlement is that loyalty must be measured comparatively
between classes, then the comparisons between individuals in any
group claim should also be considered. 16 1 What loyalty have class action lawyers shown any number of future claimants in other contexts-school desegregation, 162 prison reform, employment
157
CompareMODEL CODE, supra note 31, DR 7-101; with MODEL RULES, supra note 20,
Rule 1.3 (moving "zeal" to the comments and replacing it with requirements of diligence
and competence). The Comments to MODEL RULE 1.3 state that "a lawyer is not bound to
press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2."
158
In any representational arrangement there will also be the problem of conflicts of
interests in the fee arrangements that will provide different interests and incentives for the
lawyers to play mini-max games with lawyer effort and client recovery. There are different
conflicts in both contingent fee and hourly rates. See Murray B. Schwartz & Daniel J.B.
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in PersonalInjury Litigation, 22 STAN. L.
Rv. 1125, 1126 (1970). There is also a "conflict" in the allocation of scarce time and
resources for lawyers on salary-government lawyers, in-house lawyers, public defenders,
and legal services lawyers. See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 52, at 239.
159 For a longer explication of how our legal system of advocacy presumes an individual maximization model in advocacy in both litigation and negotiations, see generally
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39.
160 This appears to be the basis of Professors Coffee's and Koniak's assessments-the
future claimants were "sold out" because they received a deal that was worth less than the
presently settled inventory of cases and thus class counsel were disloyal to part of the class.
In this sense the disloyalty of the "bad deal" signals to them not only an impermissible,
nonconsentable conflict of interest, but also a "fraud" under the standards of approval of
the class settlement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
161 Does this analysis lead us to a kind of "equal protection" analysis for classes or subclasses in court certified class actions that does not apply in privately negotiated individual
claims? What if the legal system awards similarly situated claimants different amounts for
similar claims? See Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustie,Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class

Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REv 811 (1995).

162 One could argue that the well-intentioned actions of civil rights lawyers seeking
desegregation of schools has actually contributed to the resegregation of schools, a "disloyal" act to future claimants seeking a quality, integrated education. See Derek Bell, Serv-
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discrimination, welfare reform-where settlements are entered into
that clearly affect future entrants to the system? 163 The concept of
loyalty underlying the concurrent conflict of interests rules becomes
problematic in a number of areas. Just because there are loyalty
problems in other forms of representation, however, does not mean
that conflicts rules should be ignored or rationalized here. Rather, I
hope to expose how difficult it is to enforce our present conflict rules
in any context.
Conflict of interest rules also support other less well-recognized
values in our regulation of the legal profession. Concern for maintaining the confidences and loyalty of clients has led to some redistribution of legal services. As modern litigation has proliferated,
increasing the numbers of parties and issues in lawsuits, conflicts rules
require the appointment or retention of separate counsel for more
people and issues in particular lawsuits.' 6 4 This is, in essence, the real
value underlying the conflicts of interest challenges in many cases, including mass torts: plaintiffs' lawyers want the "rewards" of contingent
fees spread among them. Conflict of interest challenges are used strategically, not only to remove particular law firms or lawyers from representation, but to break up perceived "monopolies" of
representation. 165 Conflict of interests rules may serve some lawyer
interests, as well as client interests, and these interests may or may not
be in tension in particular cases. The rules also pit lawyers against
each other, and the motions to disqualify, disciplinary complaints, and
ing Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and ClientInterests in SchoolDesegregationLitigation,85 YALE

LJ.470, 471 (1976).
163
The argument is often made here that these institutional reform cases only involve
declarative or injunctive relief and not monetary relief. But see Laycock, supra note 141.
This distinction seems largely false to me-in both employment discrimination cases (future hires or future promotees) and welfare cases (changes in eligibility requirements)
there are clearly monetary issues, even if they are not formally labeled damages, and "settlements" and judgments in those class actions bind, whether wittingly or not, future potential claimants of those institutions.
164 This development can be seen not only in large scale private litigation involving
liability, insurance, securities, and corporate claims, but also in bankruptcy, criminal defense, child abuse and domestic relations, environmental law, civil rights law, and virtually
any area wherejoinder of more than two parties is necessary to resolve disputes or to plan
transactions.
165
In the entertainment cases, for example, conflicts issues are often raised by clients
after a deal has gone bad and a client is looking for a way to void or challenge a transaction. When lawyers use conflicts of interest challenges to disqualify a particular lawyer or
law firm, they often do so midstream, with the effect, if successful, of the appointment of
another firm or lawyer. Thus, in the entertainment context, for example, the conflicts
rules could be used to break up the "monopoly" of a few lawyers who claim expertise and
the knowledge required to put a deal together. To the extent that the settlement in In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL
No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994), was more inclusive of plaintiffs' lawyers
at the negotiating stages, some of these problems were avoided.
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challenges to settlements like these reveal, in a very public way, the
66
real conflicts of interests-competition among lawyers.'
2.

Collusion

Though not formally attached to a particular ethics rule, the
claim of collusion or "picking off' of a particular set of plaintiffs' lawyers leading to an alleged "sell out" in the settlement has also raised
issues of what constitutes zealous and loyal representation in these
cases. Once again, the problem of evaluating such a claim arises at
several levels. First, in group representation is it unethical for parties
to select particular negotiators for a deal that will bind a larger group?
This might lead to a challenge earlier in the proceedings, at the point
of negotiation, rather than at the post-deal fairness hearings. 16 7 Second, is it possible to determine whether the lawyers are inappropriately "colluding" by looking at the actual negotiation process, or must
we assess collusion only by post hoc evaluation of outcomes? Third, by
what standards do we measure collusion? In Georgine, Special Master
Burbank evaluated the historical values of settlements of present
claims; Judge Reed then used this evaluation for his findings of fact in
support of a conclusion of fairness for the value of settlements of fu68
ture claims.'
Both Professors Coffee and Koniak vigorously dispute those calculations. While I will not rehearse those disputes here (leaving it to
the Third Circuit to determine what standards best apply), it is clear
that our ethics rules provide little guidance on the question of which
lawyers may do what with which lawyers. 169 The rules provide even
less guidance on the question of what standards should be used to
166
Do these strategic uses of the conflicts rules undermine public confidence in lawyers? I wondered what the 25 claimants at the Georgine hearing thought the lawyers were
arguing about.
167
Query how the parties here could have raised questions about the improprieties of
counsel choices or activities during the negotiation process with no formal lawsuit filed?
This is why commentators such as Professors White and Hazard suggest that we cannot
regulate negotiation activity, which is necessarily private, and in cases prior to the filing of
lawsuits, outside the purview of courts or other agencies. Though I am realistic enough to
think it will not be practically possible, one could "regulate" negotiation activities with
process and substantive rules of fairness and create a body to deal with complaints under
such rules (such as disciplinary bodies with both lawyers and lay members). Like me,
Judge Weinstein has suggested a two-tiered "fairness" hearing-one prior to notice of setdement (which could consider such issues as adequacy of counsel) and another after consummation of the settlement. Remarks ofJudge Weinstein at ABA Section of Litigation,
10th Annual Mid-Year Products Liability Meeting (Feb. 25, 1995) (Panel on Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation).
168 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 307-10 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
169 This "hands off' attitude is merely an expression of our values of free choice and
open access to the legal system.
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evaluate the outcomes achieved by lawyers.' 70 Rapacious actions on
the part of defense lawyers who seek to settle with particular plaintiffs'
lawyers seem a product of the age of "hostile takeovers" and other
competitive acts. To regulate these issues as a matter of ethics, we
must determine both how much freedom clients actually have in the
choice of their lawyers and what ability those clients possess to refuse
consent in an environment where disparities of information may be
enormous. These problems are compounded in situations, like Georgine, where some claimants may not yet even know they are injured.
3.

Restrictions on Practice

Model Rule 5.6(b) prohibits lawyers from making agreements
that restrict that lawyer's right to practice as part of the settlement of a
controversy between parties. 17' To avoid the application of that rule
in Georgine,Judge Reed found that the agreement to process future
claims along the medical and other criteria of the settlement of future
claims was "not intended" to restrict practice but was merely a "guideline" for client counseling and screening. 172 The amended provision
of the settlements with the firm of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson
& Poole states that:
Plaintiff Counsel therefore agrees, unless in the exercise of its independent professional judgment, given some unforeseen circumstances, it determines otherwise, to recommend that its clients
seriously consider, and accordingly will use its best efforts to encourage, each client to accept this alternative dispute resolution
procedure.' 73
Though the court found this to be either a screening device or a description of client advice, it does appear to be a restriction on practice, if practice includes the advice and counseling provided to
clients. 17 4 Though the final agreement was drafted to allow counsel
"inappropriate circumstances" to conclude otherwise, one wonders
how often the settling lawyers will not urge the medical criteria on
future claimants (and, if they fail to do so, what recourse the defendants will have under the agreement). The interpretation thus given to
Model Rule 5.6, that absent intent the attorneys could not violate the
170
Professor Hazard has recently argued that we must simply accept that an important
part of the work of our legal profession just cannot be regulated. See Hazard, supra note
35.
171 MODEL RuLys, supra note 20, Rule 5.6.
172 Georgine v. Amchem, Prods., Inc., 157 F.P.D 246, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
173 Id. at 301.
174 Alternatively, it is possible that the court agreed with Professor Hazard's testimony,
and concluded that even if there was a violation of MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 5.6
(b), it was not a significant or material violation that would undercut the loyalty or diligence of the lawyers who negotiated the deal. See Georginm, 157 F.R.D at 301.
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ethical rules, creates a new standard under the ethics codes. One can
hope that this decision will be limited to the context in which it occurred: cases determining whether a violation of Model Rule 5.6 rendered the lawyers inadequate counsel under the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and where such a violation
(in Professor Hazard's view) would be so insignificant as not to disturb
the "adequacy" of counsel under Rule 23.175
Though I disagree with the court's treatment of this issue on the
merits of whether Model Rule 5.6 was violated (I think it was, despite
the "weasel" language), Georgineillustrates several of the difficulties in
applying the ethics rules to class action settlements. First, Judge Reed
and Professor Hazard give interpretations to an ethics rule in the context of a class action rule standard that changes the meaning of the
ethics rule itself.1 7 6 Does Georginerecognize a new standard of liability
("intent to violate ethics rules"), demonstrating that when the rules do
not seem "appropriate" for the situation, the rule interpretation will
be manipulated? The practical significance of this decision is the revelation that the ethics rules "don't work" in this context. The very
essence of the settlement of future asbestos cases is a restriction on
practice. Future claims will be processed through the agreed upon
ADR procedure (a process limitation on representation), and claims
will be evaluated by the medical standards suggested in the settlement
(a substantive restriction of practice). That this is styled a counseling
session in which "clients will be encouraged" to accept these terms of
representation does not diminish the fact that it imposes a restriction
on practice. Either we will have to prohibit future claims settlement or
the ethics rules will have to adapt to these particular substantive
contexts.
Thus, it should be evident that the professional responsibility
rules for lawyers do not adequately address the issues that arise when
175 The court chose to rely on Professor Hazard's expert testimony for reasons stated
in the opinion. Professor Hazard alternately testified on issues of ethics and their relation
to the class action standards. Academics know that Professor Hazard is an expert with respect to both ethics and civil procedure, but it is not clear from the transcripts whether
Professor Hazard was formally "qualified" on the stand with respect to both areas of law.
This fact of double expertise clearly seems to have affected Judge Reed's determinations
with respect to the credibility and trustworthiness of the multiple experts. Judge Reed discounted the expert testimony of Professors Coffee, Koniak, and Cramton because they did
not have familiarity with asbestos cases. Whether wittingly or not, Judge Reed is suggesting
that experts must have "substantive ethics expertise'-that experts on ethics must also have
expertise with respect to the subject matter of the litigation about which they are testifying.
Since this is not a malpractice or disciplinary matter, one could wonder why expert testimony was required at all.
176 And one can wonder what effect this will have on interpretation of MODEL RuLEs,
supra note 20, Rule 5.6(b) in ethics contexts. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 371 (1993), which preceded this agreement and was invoked in
the Georgine testimony.
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assessing whether a particular settlement should be approved. 17 7
What standards, then, should we apply?
B.

Non-Rule Standards of Ethics or Fairness

To assess the fairness and ethical merits of a settlement, courts
and practitioners should ask some questions that the parties in Georgine failed to raise. 178 These questions include:
1. What constitutes adequate client counseling about the consequences of such settlements or of choosing or agreeing to be "class
representatives"?
2. How do attorney fee structures relate to what attorneys negotiate for and agree to in substantive settlement agreements?
3. By what standards should a court evaluate the quality of a "privately" negotiated settlement? Does the standard change when parties
seek the court's imprimatur in approving the settlement?
4. Who is qualified to represent and judge claims that are not yet
"ripe" but still have an effect on the resolution of currently existing
claims of others?
5. What roles of intervention by judges, special masters, magistrates, private third party neutrals, and groups of lawyers are appropriate for the achievement of "global peace" in mass litigation (and by
what standards should those roles be measured)?
6. Do settlements of mass torts cases require their own ethics (as
well as procedural) rules?
7. How should the ethics or justice of any settlement be measured, as compared to a litigated case?
Several types of arguments and proposed standards have been advanced on the issue of the "ethics" of settlement. Commentators like
Professors White and Hazard have suggested that we cannot know
what goes on in the "private black box" of settlement and therefore,
cannot easily judge how the parties have allocated their "zones of
agreement" or "cooperative surpluses." 179 If the parties seem to have
negotiated at arms length and are "satisfied" with their deal, then the
177 Even "adequacy of counsel" under the class action requirements involves more
than the ethics issues. Indeed, there is a tension between the requirements of the adequacy
rule and the ethics rules. Ronald L. Motley andJoseph F. Rice, appointed class counsel, see
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 258, have "conflicts" precisely because they are so "adequate." If
counsel here were not so expert and did not have so many cases pending, they never would
have been in the position of negotiating this settlement in the first place. In this sense they
are just like the entertainment lawyers who say they have to represent everyone in the deal
because they are the only ones who know how to do it. The "adequacy" makes the conflict.
178 Note, for example, that most of Professor Koniak's analysis of the Georgine settlement focuses on the "macro"justice questions of the fairness of the settlement and not on
specific ethical rule violations. See Koniak, supranote 27.
179 See Hazard, supra note 35.
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court should leave them alone or at least confine itself to a review of
the bargaining process. Note that this begs the question of how to
evaluate settlements like those in mass torts class actions, where the
parties may not have fully "consented" to the result.18 0
In contrast, other commentators lament that settlements fail to
track the principles of law and thus allow private parties to avoid the
dictates of public policy and publicly ordered values.1 8 1 Others have
suggested that because negotiation processes are private and not subject to the discipline of a third party judge or neutral we should more
stringently regulate attorney conduct in settlement negotiations.
Such regulations would include a duty of candor and a duty not to
enter into unconscionable agreements. 182 In a similar vein, some
have suggested that specific rules cannot govern or cabin the complexities of modem law practice but that we should be accountable for
"ethical discretion"' 83 or "civic responsibility"' 8 4 in our lawyering.
My own view (more fully elaborated in other places 8 5 ) is that
negotiated settlements offer us an opportunity to solve problems that
the litigation system cannot solve with its "limited remedial imagination" of money damages or injunctions, based on the adjudication of
past facts or disputes with a few exceptions for ordering future relations. 186 Moreover, cases involving serious injuries and repetitive issues of fact and causation generate enormous transaction costs that
detract from claimant awards. As a result, claimants themselves might
187
prefer alternatives to litigation.
180 The ethical rules do require counsel to transmit settlement offers to clients for
their decision. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 1.4; MODEL CODE, supra note 31,

EG 7-7.
181

See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 42; Fiss, supra note 50; Luban, supra note 42.

182 The primary proponent of this view is my colleague Murray Schwartz. See Schwartz,
supranote 35 (arguing that nonadvocates cannot claim immunity from moral accountability). This argument "lost" in the final version of MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 4.1.
But Professor Koniak urges such a requirement of "greater candor" in mass torts settlement. See Koniak, supra note 27, at 1127. Finally, I read Professor Hazard as suggesting
that if the settlement process is a black box, it might be important for us to demand great
"moral responsibility" for our profession when we act in that task. See Hazard, supra note
35.
183 William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Laryering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1135
(1988).
184 See Robert Gordon & William Simon, The Redemption ofProfessionalist, in L-wv.s'
IDEALS/LAvYERS'

PRACTICES:

TRNsFORMATIONS

IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 230-57

(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
185 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a
Theory, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. Rzs. J. 905; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 19; Menkel-Meadow,
supranote 39; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyhow? A Philosophicaland DemocraticDefense of Settlement (In Some Cases), GEo. LJ. (forthcoming 1995).
186 See OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNGTION (1978).
187 One study reveals that criminal defendants were likely to perceive the outcomes of
plea bargains as fairer than the outcomes of trials. SeeJean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein,
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If ever there were situations calling for the "solving of problems,"
mass torts like asbestos cases certainly seem to be them. Because mass
torts implicate important public issues and resources, 188 the resolution of these cases through a hybrid of private negotiation and public
approval (through court imprimatur of settlements) necessitates the
development of standards for measuring the ethics and fairness of negotiated outcomes that are in the "public domain." Though some
may dispute that mass torts are different from private, individual
cases, 189 it is clear that since products liability rules began to expand
responsibility to include multiple defendants, more than two parties
have been involved in most cases, 19 0 and the structure of litigation and
the relationships it creates has dramatically changed. While it is not
clear that all mass torts are themselves alike or that all require public
or similar treatment, when courts are called upon to approve mass
class action settlements, public institutions and interests are invoked,
and we must therefore consider what standards they are to be judged
by. Thus, because I believe that ethical settlements are both possible
and capable of achieving good, if not perfect, solutions to important
public problems like mass torts, I will next consider the principles we
need to consider to craft just and ethically arrived at solutions to the
settlements of mass tort cases and offer some concrete proposals.
IV
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ETHICAL SETTLEMENT OF MASS TORTS

Here I examine some of the foundational challenges in our principles and underlying values that I see emerging from recent mass tort
litigation.
A. Preserving Individual Justice
Must our ideals about individualjustice'9 1 be compromised or reshaped to provide some form of justice in mass disasters? This is not
When isJusticeFair?An IntegratedApproach to the Outcome Versus ProcedureDebate, 1987 AM. B.
FouND. REs. J. 675, 675 (1987).
188 I do not think it is merely the "numbers" that distinguish mass torts from ordinary
cases, although this might be enough to justify public scrutiny of case settlements. Mass
torts raise issues of public responsibility in the production, distribution, and use of goods
and services. Thus, it is not only the numbers, but the type of issues, and the effects such
cases have had on our procedural system (due to their complexity, as well as their numerosity) that create their "differentness."
189

See, e.g., Siliciano, supranote 2.

190

See descriptions of modem products and enterprise liability in MARc FRANKLIN,
TORT LAW AND ITs ALTERNATIVS (1992); Gary Schwartz, The Beginningand the PossibleEnd of
the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. Raw. 601, 616 (1992); Rabin, supra note 6, at
817.
191 The constitutional parameters for what may be required for individual members of

money damages class actions are set out in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
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only a question about how competing plaintiffs can obtain fair legal
process and a just outcome, but how "justice" can be obtained by all
who are affected by a "mass" tort. For example, should we consider
the fates of present employees of corporations who threaten or use
bankruptcy to avoid mass tort payments of past employees? Should
claimants suffering similar injuries have a "communitarian" responsibility to one another, contrary to the ethic suggested by the individual
advocacy model? 192 Such a difference is suggested not only in Judge
Weinstein's proposals for ethics in mass torts, 93 but also by legal services lawyers and academics confronting the problem of providing
19 4
scarce resource legal services to masses of eligible clients.
In my view, individualjustice can still be achieved in mass cases by
using different processes and procedures than those currently used in
full trial adjudication. For example, the fast-track ADR procedure currently being utilized in Dalkon Shield litigation' 95 provides individual
hearings and determinations of some issues (causation and damages)
after "class determination" of other issues (liability and product defect). Where parties seek individualized process and confrontation
with a "defendant" or where they desire definitive rulings from a neutral third party, some form of hearing that is less than full-scale adjudication in court and more than an administered mechanical

(1985). Due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to
opt out (in nonmandatory class actions). Id. at 812-14. The Second Circuit, in ruling on
challenges to the Agent Orange settiement, did not apply Shutts to class actions composed
of unknowing plaintiffs. In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1435 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994). Thus, it remains unclear what is constitutionally
required for claimants who do not yet know that they are potential plaintiffs.
192
This question implicates important issues of democratic theory that I do not discuss
here. For example, what is the role of the individual in a mass society? What responsibilities do members of a society have to each other? What responsibility does a legal system
have to treat like cases alike? Would equal protection of the law as applied to courts require judges to "grid" civil verdicts in particular cases the way mandatory sentencing at-

tempts to "equalize" criminal punishment?
193 See generallyWeinstein, supra note 21.
194 See, e.g., Bellow & Kettleson, supranote 52; Breger, supra note 69; Menkel-Meadow
& Meadow, supra note 52; Tremblay, supra note 52.
195 See Feinberg, supra note 2; Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust Second Amended Rules
Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Second Amended
Rules of ADR].
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application of a grid or formula 96 may be necessary. This can be
97
made a party option.'
In the quest for efficient aggregate settlements versus full-scale
litigated justice, we must be mindful of the fact that parties are not all
alike. The advantages of a variety of ADR forms is that parties may
choose what process they want. 198 While it may be expensive and difficult to administer choices about how to process cases, claimants would
gain both greater access to the legal system and a feeling of participation in a system that is otherwise the product of a compromise of full
litigation and lawyer-dominated settlement. 199 Choices could also be
structured by claimants' committees voting on a variety of alternative
process choices.
Thus, in my view, we must take account of aggregate justice
needs-the availability of process and funds to all eligible parties-as
we consider what individuals would consider just. Like those who
have struggled with the problem "in the real world," I believe some
hybrid process would be useful, but I do not believe it needs to be
conceived of as a "compromise" of process values.

196
The issue here is whether parties will be willing to have their claims heard by other
than federal (or state) judges. Most ADR procedures use nonjudicia personnel. Thus,
while individualized hearings could be conducted, the question is whether mass tort claimants, more than other claimants, have to give up their "right" to ajudicial officer. From an
administrative perspective, the crucial question is what matters judges should hear and
what consequences will befall the system if individual cases are removed to other tribunals.
For an argument that certain kinds of cases are more likely to be considered less deserving
ofjudicial time, see Judith Resnik, Housekeeping. The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909 (1990).
197
In my experience as a Dalkon Shield arbitrator, some claimants desire a hearing of
some sort (though virtually all seem to want private hearings, given the nature of their
injuries and the issues involved) and others prefer no contact at all with the "process" as
long as they feel they have received a fair amount of compensation (within the limits provided by the settlement). For a discussion of the policies and procedures governing the
Dalkon Shield claims process, see Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust:
ParadigmLost (orFound?), 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 617 (1992).
198 Recall Judge Learned Hand's comment that he dreaded a lawsuit "beyond almost
anything else short of sickness and death." Learned Hand, TheDeficienies of Trials to Reach
the Heart of the Matter,3 AssoCsxTION OF THE BAR OF THE CITr OF NEv YoRy, LECURES ON
LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926). Others, of course, relish the thought of going to trial and
making sure there is a public airing of a troublesome issue.
199 Too often, in my view, mass tort settlements select one particular form of ADR
(usually some form of arbitration) without examining the advantages and disadvantages of
different processes for different parties. See Frank EA Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg,
Fittingthe Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 9 NEG. J. 49
(1994). Some courts have experimented with a "menu" of ADR options and some versions
of the recently drafted Health Care Act offered a menu of ADR possibilities for medical
malpractice claims. See Health Security Act (Clinton Bill) § 5301(b) (1); Senate Finance
Comm. (Malpractice Reform) Bill; Senate Labor Committee Bill § 5301 (drafts, proposed
June 17, 1994).
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B. The Relationship Between Client and Attorney
What is a good relationship between lawyer and client? What
forms of communication can we require between professionals and
their clients for truly "informed" consent to be made about both process choices and settlement possibilities? How much individual counseling must or can there be in cases affecting many people? How loyal
must or can that lawyer be to an individual client; How and when is
loyalty compromised when single groups of lawyers represent many
claimants in a particular litigation and "trade" on their aggregation of
2 00
claims?
Does such multiple representation provide countervailing advantages, such as economies of scale or expertise, that need to be considered? Some clients will need and want individual relationships with
lawyers; others may be perfectly content with accurate information dispensed by mass mailings or computer and video programs.2 0 ' We
need to explore the ideal of the individualized lawyer-client relationship in all cases. Victims of mass torts may provide greater comfort to
each other in support groups than overworked and routinizing lawyers, as long as information conveyed is accurate. Accordingly, we
need to explore other methods of providing representation. 20 2 It is
ironic that so many of the critics of mass torts class actions are former
civil rights class action lawyers. We should remember the group meetings with tenant associations, welfare rights organizations, workers' organizations and unions, prison reform groups, and parent groups,
that provided the only contact some class members had with a lawyer
in their search for rule and institutional changes, as well as
03
compensation. 2
Can committees of lawyers representing committees or communities of clients effectively represent groups of people? This has been
attempted in a number of mass tort cases. 20 4 This is a radical departure from our notion of individual lawyers representing individual
200
Such actions are not necessarily class actions. Others include inventories or "bundles" of settlements.
201 Including those which may be interactive and allow questioning and response.
202 Including lay representation in some matters. I am not suggesting that it would be
appropriate in asbestos cases although some pro se claimants have represented themselves
very ably in Dalkon Shield cases, despite somewhat complicated medical issues.
203 We should also remember that the issues raised here in mass tort class actions are
not new. Derrick Bell raised issues about conflicts of interests between attorneys and clients
and different client groups in the context of school desegregation cases with respect to
both the litigation strategies and settlements. See Derek A. Bell, Jr., Seving Two Masters:
IntegrationIdeals and ClientInterests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976).
204 See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (hotel disaster); In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 WL
114580 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994).
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person or entity clients. Do we know enough about what makes a
good relationship between lawyers and clients to be able to regulate
uniformly what that relationship should consist of outside of the oneto-one paradigm? 20 5
C. Fee Structures
What are the effects of awyer payment structureson relations to clients, as well as quality of outcomes? Should the macro effects on the
legal profession, legal system, and potential clients (i.e., the public) be
considered in rule making and ethical decisionmaking? For example,
should conflict of interest rules be strictly enforced to spread more
diffusely representation of clients to a greater number of lawyers, redistributing work and wealth to lawyers on a market competition theory of ensuring both quality of work and efficiency (demonstrated by
lower prices)?206 Should legal fees, especially contingent fees, be
capped in relation to settlements? 20 7 If punitive damage awards are
capped or limited in mass torts settlements, perhaps windfall "rewards" should be capped as well. Both limits are designed to return
more dollars to claimants in "real damages," even if they diminish
other values of the legal system, such as deterrence for defendants
and incentives for policing and claiming by plaintiffs and their
lawyers.
D.

Outcome Fairness vs. Process Fairness
What is the relationship of assessments of fairness of process to fair-

ness of outcomes? Critics of Georgine complain about the "likely" unfair205
Here Inam moved by the colloquy of two of my former colleagues, Howard Lesnick
and Mark Spiegel. See EuzABETH DvoRKN ET AL., BECOMING A LAwYER: A HuMANSTnIc PERsPEcTV E ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PRorssO ausM 200-02 (1981). It may not matter who
actually makes the decision-attorney or client-what matters is the quality of the human
dialogue between them. See also Warren Lehman, The Pursuitofa Client'sInteres, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 1078 (1979) (discussing lawyer-client relations). We also know that failure to communicate is one of the largest sources of client complaints about lawyers. See ABA CENTER
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL Disci-

PUINE, SURVEY ON LAWvER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (1989) (approximately 20% of malpractice
claims are due to "poor client relations").
206 This is the basis of my analysis in the entertainment cases. See Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 39. Should I treat mass torts differently because of the quality of legal and
factual expertise required to accomplish economies of scale and justice in this arena? Entertainment lawyers would retort, "It's not what you know, but who you knowl" Is this
"expertise"?
207 This is a difficult issue. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (holding
attorneys' fees awarded under civil rights statute could not be limited in relation to damage award received by plaintiffs). In other contexts, such as medical malpractice, fee caps
have been sustained. Can we consider the "justice" of fee awards? Should we credit the
reward to plaintiffs' lawyers who successfully uncover new causes of action and pursue
cases, yet at the same time limit the magnitude of those "rewards" when they exceed the
value of the work done in a particular case? See, e.g Brickman, supranote 29, at 125-26.
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ness produced by the "collusion" of defendants and carefully selected
plaintiffs' counsel and the conflicts plaintiffs' counsel have with respect to different classes of clients. How much of this would we still
care about if we thought the ultimate outcomes were fair and just?20 8
With threatened and actual bankruptcies deflating settlement values,
how can we know what a "fair" return to an injured person is in a
particular mass tort?20 9 In my view, much of the legal system's focus
on process rules is merely an avoidance of scrutiny of the fairness or
justness of substantive outcomes. Can we imagine a rule system in
which we tried to do the latter? Consider the effort of drafters to include a substantive "unconscionability" standard in the Model Rules
210
of Professional Conduct in negotiation.
What is a 'fair"process? As noted above, I am not persuaded that a
"first in, first compensated" system is fair. It is, however, the bulwark
of our legal system in many areas such as procedure, property, and
commercial transactions. Settlements in mass torts have attempted to
create processes that are considered, at least by some, to be "fairer" in
allowing the more seriously injured to be compensated first. This alters our principles of process as much as the registry of pleural claims
may alter our substantive tort rules. Much of the criticism leveled at
the attorneys in these cases assumes that these attorneys will not bargain "hard" enough for their various clients or constituencies (given
208

In my view it is the absence of a clear and workable legal standard for assessing the

fairness of settlements that has led to the dilemmas in these cases. While some judges and
others suggest that FED. R Civ. P. 23(e) does not permit effective substantive scrutiny, the
opinions in both Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1194), and In

re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-11558-S,
MDL No. 926, 1994 WL 114580 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994), clearly review the terms and

quality of the substantive settlement. As process challenges are raised against settlements,
courts have responded with substantive assessments (i.e., to determine whether a legitimate
reason exists for differences in treatment between various classes of claimants). See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 329-33. I would prefer that we articulate openly what we are doing and
try to craft some standards. SeeJudge Schwarzer's attempt to do so, Schwarzer, supranote
43. Judge Weinstein has expressed dissatisfaction with the limited standard of "up or
down" review of settlements in mass torts cases, see Weinstein, supra note 21; see also In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 94-1064, 94-1194,
94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL 223209 (3d Cir.
Apr. 17, 1995) (sustaining a class for settlement purposes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 with
discussion of settlement evaluation by reference to both "substantive inquiry into terms of

the settlement relative to the likely rewards of litigation," and "a procedural inquiry into
the negotiation process").
209 For example, prebankruptcy Dalkon Shield cases were settled for an average of
$11,000 (a figure that includes very high verdicts in a few tried cases). SeeVairo, supra note
197. Under the ADR arbitration system in place, postbankruptcy claims can be awarded up
to $20,000. See PRIVATE ADJUDICATION CENTER, DuKE UNIVERSIy, ANNUAL REPORT (1991-

1992); Second Amended Rules of ADR, supra note 195.
210

See MODEL RuLEs OF PROmsIoNAL CoNDucr Rules 4.1, 4.2 (Discussion DraftJan.

30, 1980) (proposed rules in original Robert J. Kutak draft); Schwartz, supra note 35;
White, supra note 35.
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their personal fee interests and the varieties of sub-classes of clients to
be served). But would we feel differently if we knew that this was the
best or only deal possible?21 ' Thus, we use process protections and
concerns as a proxy for predicting or measuring what we cannot really
evaluate-the quality of a particular settlement against both no settlement at all or other possible settlements. 212 What if we knew that another group of lawyers with no conflicts at all (i.e., not repeat players
in the asbestos litigation) could not achieve as good a result for either
213
individual claimants or a class of future claimants?
What is a fair outcome? The current legal standard under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (e) is that the settlement must be fair, adequate, and reasonable to be approved. 2 14 This does not mean that the
settlement has to be the best settlement possible, 2 15 but it does mean
211 At the symposium, Wendy White, counsel for CCR, the defendant-settling party in
Georgine, described how firm the bargaining was, how "hard," sharp, and expert the plaintiffs' lawyers were and how unlikely it was that defendants would have settled anything at all
if this deal was not made. Thus, the comparison for purposes of assessing the settlement is
not only what would have happened if there had been no settlement (and the cases continued in the tort system), but also what other settlements might have been achieved.
212 In negotiation theory we refer to this as measuring the settlement against the Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (ATNA) (adapted from Fisher & Ury's BATNA-assessment of the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, see FISHER & URv, supra note 39, at
97-106) as a way for a negotiator to evaluate whether a good result has been achieved in a
negotiation. Is this settlement as good as or better than what will happen if there is no
settlement (return to the tort system) or are there other possible settlements that could be
made that are more Pareto optimal (making one side better off without harm to the other
side)? Courts have typically refused to enter into these substantive analyses of negotiated
results. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 they may accept or deny a settlement, but they may not
change it. See Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717, 126-27 (1986).
213 Indeed, the irony here is that some are dismayed by the "premium" paid claimants
in the settlement based on who their lawyers are (settlements are based on historical recoveries by particular law firms in the Georginesettlement). Critics view this as another form of
self-dealing by particular plaintiffs' lawyers, yet these values express the experience derived
from the litigation records of these "repeat play" expert lawyers. Newer or less expert
"players" generally do less well. To "conflict out" the experienced lawyers might make for
a "fairer" looking process with more dispersed and less cartel-like lawyer behavior, but it
could lead to lower recoveries for plaintiffs. Whether different mass torts or other areas
actually require the degree of expertise claimed remains an interesting, as well as an
under-studied, empirical question.
214 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e).
215 Negotiation theorists and practitioners are continuing to explore this difficult question. We can only assess the real value of a settlement if we know the private bargaining
values and information from both sides (this explains why negotiators often employ
mediators-to produce more private information, see Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND P.AGcrIcE 323 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin
eds., 1991)) which are generally not known either ex ante or post hoc in any negotiated

settlement. Thus, in evaluating whether a settlement is "good" or "wise," there are any
number of criteria that may be used, and there are both analytic and ideological criteria
that divide us. Is the purpose of a negotiation for each side to maximize individual gain
(ie., traditional, adversarial, and distributive bargaining goals) or to make a Pareto optimal
solution for all negotiation parties (a more integrative, problem-solving, social, other-directed approach to bargaining goals)? For fuller statements of these differences, see
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that a court or evaluator of a settlement process, not to mention the
participants, should know something about what criteria can be used
to assess a settlement.2 16 Ironically, it may be that we will have to emphasize different points of evaluation in different cases. If we trust the
parties' "consent" to an outcome in a private and dyadic negotiation,
we may use outcome satisfaction as the criteria forjudging fairness. In
the "mass" case where we may not be able to ascertain consent, we
may have to provide procedural protections such as the class action
and ethics rules. Alternatively, if these protections prove impracticable in particular cases, as they may in cases of unknowing claimants,
then we will have to more fully scrutinize outcomes. The latter approach appears to be what the court and its critics have done in
Georgine.
Here I attempt to specify some principles that could be used to
assess a settlement under a regime of increased court scrutiny of such
settlements. First, we must consider what the realistic baselines of comparison are. If Georgineand Lindsey had not been settled, what would
actually happen to the claimants? Some would return to the tort system, where some would have trials, but most would effectuate individual or group negotiated settlements that might be better or worse in
individual cases from what is achieved in the class settlements. Second, we must determine whether the settlement is as close to a Paretooptimal settlement as one can determine it to be based on available
information to the decisionmaker. This determination turns on
whether there are obvious ways in which the deal could have been
made better for one set of parties other than at the expense of the
others. 2 17 Third, were the negotiators qualified to conduct the negotiations? 21 8 Fourth, was the negotiation achieved without undue transaction costs, as compared with the costs involved in alternative ways of

39,at 56-80; LAX & SEBENIUS, supranote 39,at 29-45; RAIFFA, supra
note 39,at 44-65; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 89. Given the different criteria that could be
used, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 760-61, and the differences among negotiation
theorists it is not difficult to see why judges have a hard time applying any set of standards
to the evaluation of settlements in hard cases.
216
Here I part company with Professors Hazard and White, who propose that we cannot evaluate what goes on in the black box of settlement. See Hazard, supra note 35; White,
supra note 35. In my view, although it will be difficult, what we need are some standards
for assessing settlements when court approval is required or sought. See Bank of Am.Nat.
Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that parties that seek court confirmation of settlements expose themselves to different
levels of public scrutiny than those who settle claims privately without court approval).
217 An example here might be the availability of a more flexible ADR process for claimants, though that could prove more costly for defendants.
218
This is where adequacy of counsel under FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and the ethics challenges to counsel would be appropriately analyzed.
FISHER & URY,supranote
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disposing of the dispute?2 1 9 In other words, does the settlement itself
reduce transaction costs over other ways of solving problems? 22 0 Fifth,
does the settlement treat similarly situated people similarly, but not
necessarily identically? Is there horizontal equity? Sixth, can party
"satisfaction" with the settlement be ascertained? 22 ' Seventh, is the
settlement as "objectively" fair as can be determined? 222 Eighth, was
the settlement produced with an appropriate amount of information
and participation by those with affected interests? 223 Ninth, is the set224
tlement realistic, practicable, durable, or mutually adaptive?
E.

Creating New Standards

How should we make and interpretstandards? Are we better off with
vague, transsubstantive standards that allow us to interpret individual
cases using the "facts" of context and the expediencies of practicality?2 25 A deeply cynical reading of the record of the expert testimony
219
If negotiations become too long and expensive, it may be better to just return to
the conventional dispute resolution system. I have observed that in some areas ADR is
being used to add another layer of costs, expenses, and delay rather than to promote more
efficient ways of resolving disputes. Where that is the case it may be better to simply try the
cases. See Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement, supranote 19, at 493-98.
220 This inquiry could include scrutiny of such transaction costs as attorneys' fees.
221 This inquiry might encompass claimant voting, opt-out procedures, fairness hearings, and other court devices for scrutinizing whether those who have settled really understand what has happened and thus testing the lawyer-counseling function. I defer for the
moment the difficult question of what party satisfaction is. Some define successful negotiations as those where everyone is unhappy (inferring that a hard bargain or a compromise
was reached); others of us believe that it is possible for both parties to view a settlement
both realistically and positively.
222 This is where considerations of law and principle, economic evaluations of the
"deal," common practices, and public and community standards are appropriate to consider. Note that some would see legal standards as being the sole determinant of fairness.
See Condlin, "Casesan Both Sides, " supranote 42; Luban, supranote 42. 1 believe that negotiated settlements can be objectively fair and not necessarily track legal principles in several
situations: where the law is "unjust," where the rules that legislatures have drafted for the
many are inapplicable to the few of a particular dispute; where the parties are able to craft
their own rules, standards, principles, or objective criteria for their own dispute (as long as
they are not unlawful); where the parties can develop solutions that would be not authorized by court or legislative powers, such as future arrangements and in-kind exchanges,
again as long as solutions are not themselves unlawful; where the law is silent or contradictory on particular issues; and finally, where the law is simply not the most salient aspect of a
dispute.
223 While this appears to be a "process" concern, it goes to the issue of whether the
outcome adequately reflects all of the factors that should have been considered-both in
terms of people participants and factual, expert, and legal information.
224 These particular measures of a good outcome are derived from Menkel-Meadow,
supranote 39, at 760-61, and Roger Fisher, A Code of Negotiation Practicesfor Lawyers, 1 NEr.
J. 105 (1985). I offer them as a starting point for framing the kinds of questionsjudges and
other evaluators of negotiated settlements need to ask to consider the fairness of
settlements.
225
I see the judicial acceptance of the conflicts "screen" in the private law firm as an
illustration of this. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 1.11. The "screen" rule in the
Model Rules applies technically only to government-private successive and vicarious con-
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and decision in Georgine could lead one to conclude that good lawyers
and judges interpret vaguely drafted standards tojustify positions that
are actually dictated by their views of the "expediency orjustness" of
their desired outcome. But do the ends of results justify the means of
self-serving interpretation?
When should we interpret the correctness of lawyer behavior? In
one sense I wonder whether Georginewas ripe on the issues of lawyer
ethics. At first reading, there might be an appearance of "collusion"
or "conflict," but do we need to wait and see how well the settlement
works before we can conclude that the bargaining was actually
faulty?2 26 Should we craft different rules to deal with different categories of mass tort cases, such as completed injuries (accidents and some
products liability), on the one hand, and injuries that produce more
gradual or latent harm on the other?
F.

Societal Implications

Do the arguments about process (ethics, procedure, and class action) obscure the real social justice, economic, and legal issues that
our society must deal with, such as who should pay for the individual
and community harms of mass torts227-private industry alone, government, or other forms of more socialized risk compensation? 22 8
What should be the responsibility of a society or community to its
members in this modem age of science and technology? Are we entitled to compensation for the harms caused by modem life or have we
assumed the risk? How should serious wrongdoers be punished?
flict situations, but many courts have accepted it in the arena of movement from one private law firm to another, given the need to permit client choice of counsel and recognition
of modem lawyer mobility.
226 Here I think of the contrasts of successes of the Manville Bankruptcy Trust and
Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust, see Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass
Settlement of Mass Torts, 53 LAw & CoN'rnMP. PROBS. 1-205 (1990) (special editor, Francis E.
McGovern). Is the difference that in the latter the injuries were "over," while still latent in
the former, with new claims being filed everyday? Does the use of class action settlements
or bankruptcies with notices actually increase the amount of claiming?
227 Settlement of the Buffalo Creek disaster litigation has come under much attack in
recent years for focusing on individual monetary settlements and not enough financial and
other support for the underlying community that was destroyed. See K~i T. ERICKSON,
EVERYrHING iN ITs PATH:

DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNrTY IN THE BuFFALo CREEK FLOOD

(1976); GERALD M. STERN, THE BuFFALo CREEK DISASTER (1976); THE BuFFALo CREEK

FLOOD: AN Acr OF MAN (Appalshop Films 1979); BuFFALO CREEK REvisrrED (Appaishop
Films 1984).
228 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, ProceduralReform as a Surrogatefor Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case:
A ProposedFederalProcedureAct, 64 Tx. L. REv. 1039 (1986); Rabin, supranote 6; Schuck,
supra note 21; Brickman, supra note 64; Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV.
785 (1990); Richard Abel, A SocialistApproach to Risk, 41 MD. L REV. 695 (1982); MichaelJ.
Saks, Do We Really Know About the Behaviorof the Tort LitigationSystem-and Why Not? 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
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V
SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS:

AcrION

MAKING MASS TORTS CLASS

SETTLEMENTS

BETTER

If there are problems and issues about the ways in which the asbestos and breast implant cases have been settled recently, I do not
think it is the current ethical rules that should bear the weight of
bringing them down. As a relatively strict ethicist but also as a "practical negotiator," I think our system has to confront and recraft standards and solutions to the issues presented by the collective
settlement of mass torts. Unlike many of my ethicist colleagues and
plaintiff lawyer friends, I am not convinced we make Faustian deals
with the devil when claims are aggregated for settlement, whether
through formal class action or in other aggregated forms (like posttort bankruptcies or multi-district litigation). I think that the aggregation of claims is here to stay, and we need to craft intelligent rules to
deal with it229
Here I offer some proposals for reform of some of the rules and
23 0
practices implicated in achieving fair aggregate claims settlement
In brief, these proposals call for more participation in the negotiation
process, by lawyers, parties, and perhaps court personnel; more varied
forms of assisted negotiation and ADR to achieve settlements; more
varieties of processes for administering claims settlements; some substantive rule changes (specifically on fees and conflicts of interests);
and most radically, more sequencing of and greater substantive review
of the settlement process and the outcomes themselves. I realize
some of these proposals may appear costly in terms of economics,
time, and wear and tear on the legal system, but I believe these reforms are necessary if we are to have public acceptance of privately
negotiated solutions to difficult social problems. I do believe that
mass tort class action settlements, which are clearly needed, can be
fair, just, and ethical; but reforms may be necessary to keep them legitimate, acceptable, and legally sustainable.

229 Has anyone else noted the irony that many of the critics of mass tort class action
settlements were often proponents of class actions in other contexts-civil rights, consumer fraud, etc.? See Mullenix, supranote 3; see also Brief of Law Teachers as Amici Curiae, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-0215)
(submitted Apr. 1, 1994) (amicus brief opposing designation of proposed class counsel).

230 Note how many of these proposals have been suggested by others already, most
notablyJudge Weinstein, supranotes 21, 53, and scholars like Peter Schuck, supranote 44,
and Robert Rabin, supra note 180. Why doesn't the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LAWvERr, take up more of these difficult "substance-based" ethical issues? Other groups may fill
the vacuum, such as the newly formed Center for Public Resources' Commission on Ethics
and Standards in ADR (1995) of which I am Chair.
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Participation in Settlement: Parties, Lawyers, and Courts

1. It may be appropriate for communities of interests, such as
committees of clients and their representatives, to participate in the
negotiation of settlements in mass tort cases. This would ensure a full
airing and representation of the differing interests. This appears to
be why many commentators are more sanguine about the breast implant settlement, which involved"greater inclusiveness and attempts to
deal with the divergent interests of plaintiffs' lawyers and the interests
they represent, 23' than the asbestos settlements.
If we pursue this line of reform, where interests coalesce into
groupings or sub-classes, we will need clearer rules for and understanding of the practice of what negotiation theorists call "coalitional"
bargaining. 23 2 Such negotiations are conducted differently and raise
issues beyond those of the dyadic adversarial model contemplated by
the current ethical rules and the ideological justifications for our adversary system. Issues of confidentiality, who can bind whom, and
what constitutes consent are some of the legal issues to be addressed.
On the practical level, clear lines of adversary alignment become
more complicated as groups of defendants and insurers line up
against other defendants, or plaintiffs split according to those who
wish to settle fast and others who prefer to wait, along the lines discussed above. As a variation on the committee theme, some courts
have appointed independent masters, guardians ad litem, 23 3 or independent counsel to assess offers, determine support for particular
proposals, or to represent classes or sub-classes of litigants. Thus,
courts may increase involvement in settlements by looking to others to
participate
in the process outside of the interested lawyers and
litigants. 2 34
2. The use of special masters, magistrates, and other court-appointed third party neutrals may make sense in order to insulate the
potential trial judge from ruling on some of the preliminary motions
and ethical issues, separate from the final fairness hearings. 23 5 Separate hearings on some of these matters may reduce what some see as
231

lam told by those close to the litigation that there will be large numbers of opt-outs

in the breast implant cases and that as a class the foreign claimants have raised issues about
fairness not unlike those of the pleural claimants in Georgine. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. 246,
319-25 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
232 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RrsOL. 243 (1994).
233
See sources cited supra note 146 (noting role of Eric Green, guardian ad litem for
purposes of assessing fairness of another asbestos settlement).
234
Undoubtedly, challenges will be raised about the court's authority to appoint
others to participate in a party-initiated adversary proceeding.
235
This was, in part, the reason for appointments of both a special master and a new
judge in aspects of rulings in Georgine. See also Day v. National Lead, 864 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.

Ohio 1994).
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the pressure forjudges to approve settlements (and the practices that
led to them) in order to reduce their dockets, or because the judges
themselves were actively engaged in the settlement discussions. Such
court-appointed third party neutrals can serve in a variety of capacities, most of which are currently unregulated as well. Magistrates and
special masters have been appointed to facilitate settlement, manage
discovery, make independent assessments on fairness and other factual and legal issues, and to conduct hearings or portions of hearings.
Although one judge has ruled that such special masters are governed
by theJudicial Code of Conduct,2 36 it remains somewhat unclear what
rules will govern those who provide such court adjunct services.
B.

More Varied Processes Both for Settlement Negotiations and
Claims Processing

1. With the use of court neutrals, class committees, and independent lawyers or masters it may be possible to develop new forms
of negotiation for the settlement of mass claims. Portions of negotiations might be made relatively more "public," with opportunities for
parties, class representatives, or groups of lawyers to present offers for
response, or, as in the case of summary jury trials, formal in-court
hearings on interim issues. Thus, one of the difficulties with the Georgine negotiation process may be the assumption of the traditional secretive dyadic negotiation process. Some privacy and secrecy will
clearly be needed to negotiate most of the complexities of mass tort
settlements and their financing, but it might be possible to conduct
aspects of the negotiation in stages, and with some greater participation of those with interests. Both private and public mediators may
serve useful functions here.
2. When settlements are crafted, we might also take a broader
look at how they are administered-in short, what process should be
due a settled claim. Here I believe greater flexibility and less polarized thinking about trial versus settlement possibilities might provide some opportunities for some forms of individualized hearings
within the context of mass "administered" settlements. Settlements
need not mean that all cases should be assigned merely for economic
evaluation to medical or other expert panels. In my view, the Dalkon
Shield ADR procedure successfully allows the opportunity for a relatively inexpensive hearing in which the claimant may "confront" (I
would prefer a more mediative process to the current arbitration process) the claims facility and have a "day in court" for the expression
236 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 739-40 (E.D.N.Y &
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling by Judge Weinstein that Special Master Ken Feinberg's alleged conflicts of interests were to be measured by the standards set in the Judicial Code of
Conduct).
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(and often cathartic effects) of experienced pain and suffering and
outrage at corporate wrongdoing.2 37 Different issues may require different treatment. Liability and certain aspects of causation may be
"determined" through settlement documents, but other individualized issues (such as specific damages) may lend themselves to hearings
of various kinds.
Here I believe, as does Judge Weinstein, 23s that some claimants
will want personal contact with some third party, perhaps not only a
judge or an arbitrator, who can demonstrate some human empathy
for what has happened as well as award appropriate damages. Other
claimants will simply want their money. In the use of such hearings
clients should have choices about representation, including lawyers
and other possible hearing representatives.
Here representation of many cases by a single lawyer demonstrates the complex advantages and disadvantages of multiple representation of similarly situated clients and demonstrates (to me) that
conflicts of interests are quite common outside of the formal class action form. Presentation of many cases with similar issues provides for
clear economies of scale and other efficiencies in representation. It
also poses the danger of signaling to the decisionmaker which cases
are better than others. While such representation presents a potential
violation of the requirement of "zealous advocacy" in the individual
case, it probably provides overall "effective" advocacy for a group of
cases.23 9 Providing varied forms of claims processing (such as choices
to litigate, settle for a specified amount, arbitrate, or mediate) allows
clients to choose among different fora, depending on what process
and substantive issues matter most to them. Such a selection process
allows individuals who are otherwise part of a large mass class to obtain some sense of individualized choice.2 40 "Back-end" opt-outs are
another process choice that may make settlements more likely to be
approved.
237

See, e.g., TOM TYLER & ALLAN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURALJUSTICE

(1988) (studies on the importance of process and the need for "voice" in party assessments
of fairness in procedural justice research).
238 Weinstein, supra note 21, at 53.
239 This has been my experience in hearing close to one hundred Dalkon Shield cases
with several "repeat play" claimants' lawyers. Here of course the "conflict" is based on the
repeat play lawyer having overall credibility (in order to maximize overall fees) by not
maintaining strong advocacy on weak claims.
240
Though I have not observed counseling sessions in which plaintiffs' lawyers have

advised their clients about the pros and cons of the various process choices under the
Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust Agreement, the choices provided do allow clients to
choose from a number of different alternatives. Data not yet available from the Private
Adjudication Center will eventually tell us how many claimants chose which process and
what the satisfaction rates were for each process. See PRIVATE AJUDICATION CENTER, supra
note 209.
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Revisions to Some Regulation

1. Where some of the problems associated with mass tort class
action settlements are related to fees and other economic incentives,
it may make sense to explore some regulation of fees. As our legal
system is reluctant to prescribe substantive standards in a variety of
areas, such as the quality of the duty to bargain or the fairness of contract terms, it has been reluctant to limit fees, for reasons of access to
241
justice, as well as antitrust considerations, except in a few situations.
Yet substantive fee regulation might do more to cure the "ills" complained of here than other reforms. Possibilities include capping percentages, prohibiting contingent fees in certain case types, 242 or

providing for court review of fees.
D.

Sequencing and Substantive Review of Class Action
Settlements

Much of what makes the resolution of class action settlements so
difficult is our legal system's need for binary rulings. Some suggest

that this is precisely what the legal system and adjudication offer. Settlements can be more flexible but court rulings cannot. If it were possible to design a more flexible process (in terms of timing and
substance) to deal with the issues that have arisen in the settlement of
mass torts, I believe we could come closer to our aspirations for
justice.
1. Courts may need to explore conflicts of interest issues at several intervals in a mass settlement. If consent is required to potentially conflicting representation at the beginning of negotiations (such
as in the case of current, past, and future claimants on a particular
fund), then courts may have to use the devices of class committees,
votes, and guardians ad litem, as well as opt-out notices at later (postsettlement) stages. Courts may revisit conflicts issues at the time of
fairness or confirmation hearings243 and perhaps later, when instances of actual harm are identified (such as self-dealing from the
241

Medical malpractice fee caps have been sustained in a number of states. See, e.g.,

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990).
242 Contingent fees are prohibited in most

of the world and are prohibited in the
United States in some forms of action, including domestic relations and criminal defense.
See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 20, Rule 1.5(d). Rule 1.5(c) also acknowledges that "other
law" may prohibit contingent fees. I think the limitation of contingent fees would be a
good idea in some cases (ie., where the risk of recovery is close to zero or the contingent
fee provides incentives for lawyers to settle for "themselves" and not for their clients or to
receive cash windfalls for minimal recovery for plaintiffs). I am realistic enough, however,
to realize that this is not a likely occurrence given the powerful lobbying efforts on the part
of the plaintiffs' bar.
243
Courts may also consider conflicts issues when negotiations are concluded, as occurred in Georgine.
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dual monitor role, vastly differential treatment of similarly situated individuals in different classes, and the like).
2. I am most interested in exploring a tiered method for assessing the approval of mass tort settlements. Some issues have to be
dealt with prior to negotiations, such as whether particular lawyers are
"adequate" for the representation, and so forth. But in my view, we
need both more regulation of what should occur in the settlement
process and more scrutiny of the outcomes of mass tort settlements.
This includes provisions for re-entry of the court if certain conditions
develop, such as inadequacy of funding or ADR processes that are established by the settlement process. Thus, if the Georgine and breast
implant settlements were approved by courts anxious to clear dockets
and utilize various forms of ADR, then I would urge the consideration
of some very limited forms of "back-end" appeals, continuing jurisdiction for monitoring purposes and mid-course evaluation by the court
of how the processes are actually working and how the conflicts issues
have actually manifested themselves. 244 The breast implant settlement
comes close to this with its provisions for several stages of opting-out
and "racheting down" at various stages of claims processing. 245 Obviously, the danger here is more uncertainty and less absolute capping
of liability for defendants, but it does make agreement more likely
and may actually decrease the number of opt-outs if the process is
deemed fair.
3. Most problematically, and radically, I would shift some of the
present scrutiny of ethics and "process" issues to greater scrutiny of
the outcomes of settlements, recognizing that this introduces the kind
of uncertainty that defendants and defendants' insurers do not want
in their settlement agreements. In the long run, however, such scrutiny should do more to combine the best elements of a mass tort settlement process that makes flexible and creative use of the public
functions of courts. 24 If the courts are to reduce their case loads by
facilitating settlements, then they must also take responsibility for assuring that the settlements which occur not only "in the shadow of the
court," but often inside of it, are fair and justify dismissal of the under244 I say this based on my experience with the Dalkon Shield litigation, which appears
to be, so far, a relatively successful form of ADR. It serves individual justice and catharsis
functions for litigants, while producing few appeals. So farJudge Merhige has heard very
few appeals from an ADR proceeding (which are technically final and binding). See, e.g.,
Reichel v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, No. 85-01307-R (E.D. Va. Bankr. Ct., Dec. 2,

1994). In my view, there should be a slightly broader standard of review. As a lowly arbitrator I have more "final order" power than most circuit courts of appeals judges.
245 Proposed Settlement Agreement In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp.), Nos. CV-92-P-10000-S, CV-94-P-11558-S, MDL No. 926,
1994 WL 114580, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994).
246 See standards to be used in evaluating outcomes in Menkel-Meadow, supranote 39,
at 760-64; Schwarzer, supra note 43 (Judge Schwarzer's proposal for a new Rule 23(f)).
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lying individual lawsuits. For those who think that mass tort cases are
not like public litigation, it is important to consider whether mass tort
class action settlements are, since settlements divest litigants of their
rights to pursue their legal claims. If the courts approve settlements
then that public function and state action must be governed by standards and exercised with public responsibility and accountability.2 47
VI
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE SETTLEMENT OF MASS TORTS

CLASS

ACTIONS CAN

TEACH

Us

ABOUT JUSTICE

AND ETHICS

Like Judge Weinstein, I believe a "humanitarian" tort system must
consider the fate of potential future claimants as well as presently injured clients when large scale or global settlements are made. When
there are multiple claimants competing over limited or potentially
limited funds there are conflicts of interests for parties as well as for
lawyers. For me, the ethical inquiry does not simply end with either
the recognition of conflicts and the disqualification of counsel, or the
expedient approval of settlements with tacit, if not explicit, approval
of some very troublesome behavior. I understand fully the practical
pressure to confirm the settlements in cases such as Georgine. Yet
there are substantive, procedural, and ethical solutions to some of the
problems raised in this symposium2 48 that strike me as more just than
binary answers with respect to the disqualification of particular groups
of lawyers, 2 49 or the up or down approval of the settlement. There
may be differences in how cases can be handled depending on who
the responsible parties are. Single defendant cases may be easier to
settle and manage than multiple defendant and government defendant cases, although the latter two case types often provide greater
assets, if more complicated negotiation processes.

247 Some might note the irony of my taking this position. For someone who began by
arguing that negotiations were a way to avoid some of the formalism and formalized solutions of adjudication and courts, I am now suggesting we return some settlements to the
scrutiny of the courts. This is because I think some settlements have public consequences,
requiring court review (especially if they have made use of court programs or facilities).
248 These problems include notice of conflicts, consent or substituted consent (i.e.,
guardians ad litem), choices of procedures for claims processing, different remedies for
different injuries, medical monitoring, returning additional funds to claimants at the end
of specified accounting periods, waiting to disburse funds till actually needed, sequenced
court involvement in what have to be considered hybrid public-private settlements.
249 Was the only remedy for finding conflicts on the part of class counsel Locks and
Motley, see discussion supranote 177, disqualification, or could the court have forced more
open negotiations by adding counsel? This is especially problematic to contemplate here
since some plaintiffs' counsel specifically rejected the deals being offered.
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What the current "crisis" 2 50 of cases teaches us is that our para-

digms for dispute settlement may not be working anymore. We can no
longer (if we ever did) promise every individual with a legally cognizable claim a fulljury trial, 25 1 nor do we seem to be able to provide every

potential client with a humanly meaningful relationship with a lawyer.
Thus, I believe we need to search for new ways to fairly process claims
25 3
and allow people who are harmed 252 (or believed they are harmed )
to have both a fair process and some compensation for their injuries.
It is questionable whether or not we can agree on enough changes of
ethical rules or the larger issues implicated in the settlement of mass
torts to effectuate change through lawyer-directed rule making. Nevertheless, it may be that eventually either the federal or state legislatures will take up some of these issues as the legal liability for mass
25 4
torts continues to be a major social and economic problem.
Whatever the successes of the conventional tort system, global settlements incorporating proper protections, innovative claims procedures, and clearer and more demanding standards seem to offer a
greater possibility of equity and fairness to claimants than our current
version of individual litigation roulette. This does not mean that I
endorse all of the details of the current mass tort settlements; it means
that I think we should develop more specific and sensitive substantive
rules to facilitate speedy, creative, and just settlements of these cases.
How we will craft new legal institutions and new legal rules, and
how we will pay for them, remains to be seen, but these cases and the
problems they raise demonstrate how our legal system works. When
real cases and controversies reach the courts, issues are decided that
lead to more cases, and in turn, to proposals for legislative and administrative changes. If other branches of government do not step in, the
courts respond. The appellate courts, academic commentators, and
250
Whether or not mass torts are a crisis, see Siliciano, supra note 2, these cases have
provided "crises" for the courts in raising deeply troubling questions about how our litigation system functions and what courts have authority to do. See Abram Chayes, TheJudge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.REv. 1281 (1976).
251
The "proceedings" in the murder trial of OJ. Simpson currently make clear how
our system would fall apart if everyone had the ability to use and test every legal theory or
tactic available for those who can afford to pay for full litigation. In a recent interview Los
Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti reported that once the "three strikes and you're out
law" becomes fully operational, none of the 541 courtrooms in the county of Los Angeles
would be available for civil trials as more and more criminal defendants would refuse to
plead guilty to a third offense that would lead to permanent incarceration. All Things Considered (National Public Radio Broadcast, Oct. 21, 1994), availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library,
NPR File.
252 Are we ready for "no-fault" for all products liability? A Consumer's Compensation
scheme? A FEMA for products, accidents, and waste dumps?
253 Should there be a uniform standard for fear of cancer claims, emotional distress,
and so forth?
254 I am, however, less sanguine about the likelihood of this occurring after our recent
effort to deal legislatively with health care reform.
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rule drafters will speak on these issues and will perhaps revise what is
currently done on either a large or incremental scale. At each juncture of rule making or institutional change, we may get pushed by
particular "crises" or "eruptions." I think mass torts cases are one example of that. We have already reversed the position of the 1966
Rules Committee that thought that class actions could never be used
for mass accidents. 2 55 Now we have to explore the contours of how
procedure, torts, and ethics rules may have to adapt to these new
fonns of action and then see whether specific rule changes cause too
much disruption in our desires for transsubstantive procedural and
ethical rules. If mass torts cases demonstrate some of the strengths of
our incremental, precedent building, common-law system 25 6 then we
should look at these "problems" as opportunities for continuing participation in an ongoing law reform effort, seeking new rules and
practices that may be more fair and just than what we can currently
offer. I don't know whether a more open and participatory negotiation process, with court sequenced and substantive review of global
settlements, will work any better than what we have, but I'd be willing
to try. Or, as a wise woman once said to me, we can see how we might
make lemonade out of lemons.

255
256

Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 918 (1995).
See ArTHoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LosT LAWmYE

FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-

SION (1998) (providing recent statements of the strengths of our common-law system);
Schuck, supra note 21, at 922-25 (same).

